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In his groundbreaking work of 1969, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay
in Interpretation, Edwin Curley attacked the traditional understanding
of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza, according to which modes
inhere in substance. Curley argued that such an interpretation generates
insurmountable problems, as had already been claimed by Pierre Bayle
in his famous Dictionary entry on Spinoza.1 Instead of having modes
1 In quoting texts from Bayle’s Dictionary, I rely on the ﬁfth French edition (Dictio-
naire historique et critique par Mr. Pierre Bayle, Amsterdam: Compagnie des
Libraries, 1734), and (mostly) on Popkin’s English translation (1991). I will refer to
Bayle’s entry by the page number in Popkin’s translation followed by the page num-
ber in the above French edition (the Spinoza entry appears in the ﬁfth volume of the
French edition). Whenever I diverge from Popkin’s translation I will mention this
fact. Unless otherwise marked, all references to the Ethics, the early works of Spi-
noza, and Letters 1-29 are to Curley’s translation (henceforth C). In references to the
other letters of Spinoza I have used Shirley’s translation (henceforward S). I use the
following standard abbreviations for Spinoza’s works: TdIE—Treatise on the Emen-
dation of the Intellect [Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione], KV – Short Treatise on
God, Man, and his Well-Being [Korte Verhandeling van God de Mesch en deszelfs Wel-
stand], Ep. – Letters, GLH – Hebrew Grammar [Compendium Grammatices Linguae
Hebraeae]. Passages in the Ethics will be referred to by means of the following abbre-
viations: a(-xiom), c(-orollary), p(-roposition), s(-cholium) and app(-endix); ‘d’ stands
for either ‘deﬁnition’ (when it appears immediately to the right of the part of the
book), or ‘demonstration’ (in all other cases). Hence, E1d3 is the third deﬁnition of
part 1 and E1p16d is the demonstration of proposition 16 of part 1. I am indebted to
Robert Adams, Ed Curley, Don Garrett, John Heil, Ilya Kliger, Mike LeBuﬀ, Lukas
Muhlethaler, Ohad Nachtomy Oded Schechter, Neta Stahl, Peter Thielke, Andrew
Yale, Nasser Zakaria and an anonymous referee for Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
cal Research for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am partic-
ularly indebted to Michael Della Rocca, whose inquisitiveness, intellectual
generosity, and kindness contributed enormously to this work. Parts and early drafts
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inhere in substance, Curley suggested that the modes’ dependence upon
substance should be interpreted in terms of (eﬃcient)2 causation, i.e., as
committing Spinoza to nothing over and above the claim that sub-
stance is the (eﬃcient) cause of the modes. These bold and fascinating
claims generated one of the most important scholarly controversies in
Spinoza scholarship of the past thirty-ﬁve years.3
In this paper I argue against Curley’s interpretation and attempt
to reestablish the traditional understanding of Spinozistic modes as
inhering in God and as predicated of God. I also criticize Curley’s
philosophical motivation for suggesting this interpretation. In order
to show that, for Spinoza, modes are predicated of—and inhere
in—substance, I will proceed in the following manner. First, I will
summarize Curley’s arguments against substance-mode inherence and
of the paper were presented at the New England Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy
(Dartmouth College, 2002) and the Eastern APA (2004). I am indebted to the
participants in these sessions for their helpful criticisms and remarks.
2 Curley rarely qualiﬁes substance-mode causality as eﬃcient causation. Yet the termi-
nology he uses in this context is clearly one of eﬃcient causation. For example, in
Behind the Geometrical Method (1988), Curley claims that God ‘‘produces and acts on
things other than God’’ (38), and that the substance-mode relation ‘‘turns out to be a
form of the doctrine of determinism’’ (50). (Cf. John Carriero, ‘‘Mode and Substance
in Spinoza,’’ 1995, p. 254, for a similar point.) In recent correspondence Curley writes,
‘‘I don’t recall ever using the term eﬃcient to modify the causality which God (insofar
as he is inﬁnite) has with respect to his modes. I realize that Spinoza himself uses it in
IP16C1, but I think that’s potentially misleading. The relation I see in Spinoza is in
important respects unlike eﬃcient causality. On my reading of Spinoza, ﬁnite modes
are temporal instantiations of timeless patterns described by the laws of nature’’ [Cor-
respondence with author, January 2005]. I do in fact think that Curley was right (in
the past) in using terminology which is typical of eﬃcient causation (e.g., ‘production’
and ‘determinism’). Apart from E1p161, there are many other texts that support the
conclusion that Spinozist causality is (at least primarily) eﬃcient causality. The very
notion of an immanent cause [causa immanens] is nothing but a sub-species of eﬃcient
causality, as one can see from the reliance of E1p18d on E1p16c1, and from Spinoza’s
explicit statement in the Short Treatise (KV, I, iii| I ⁄ 35 ⁄ 13-21). (Cf. Spinoza’s claim in
Ep. 60 that ‘‘an eﬃcient cause can be internal as well as external.’’) Following Hume
we tend to think of eﬃcient causality as being essentially in time (i.e., the eﬀect is sup-
posed to follow the cause). I do not think Spinoza accepts this view. As I will later
argue (see §6 below), for Spinoza the essence of a thing is the eﬃcient cause of its pro-
pria (though these two, essence and propria, are simultaneous).
3 In this paper I will discuss several arguments of Curley’s critics (primarily, those of
Bennett, Carriero, Della Rocca, and Jarrett). Among the notable scholars who are
sympathetic to Curley’s interpretation, one should mention Woolhouse (The Con-
cept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics, 1993, p. 51) and Mason (The
God of Spinoza, 1997, pp. 30-32). Schmaltz (‘‘Spinoza on the Vacuum,’’ 1999) tends
to accept Curley’s critique of the traditional reading, yet he suggests an interesting
alternative to both Curley’s and the traditional approach to the substance-mode
relation. According to Schmaltz, the substance is the eternal and indivisible essence
that ‘‘grounds’’ the modes (177). The latter view is consistent with my claim below
(see §6) that for Spinoza modes are God’s propria.
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present his alternative interpretation of the substance-mode relation. I
will then present what I consider to be the most compelling argu-
ments against Curley’s interpretation. Some of these arguments have
already been suggested in the literature of the past thirty years (and
by Bayle); however, as far as I know, most of the arguments I will
be making are new. In the subsequent section I will respond to
objections that Curley and Bayle advance against Spinoza’s view of
God as the substratum in which all things inhere. Finally, I will
address whether Spinozistic modes are predicated of (and not only
inhere in) substance, and whether Spinoza considered modes to be
particular properties (or ‘‘tropes,’’ in the jargon of contemporary
metaphysics).
Since Bayle’s claims will be used both in support of and against Cur-
ley’s interpretation, it would be appropriate to say a few introductory
words on Bayle’s stance. In his Spinoza entry, Bayle criticizes Spinoza’s
claim that all things are modes of God, claiming that it ‘‘is the most mon-
strous hypothesis that could be imagined, the most absurd, and the most
diametrically opposed to the most evident notions of our mind.’’4 Bayle,
however, has no doubt that when Spinoza claims that all things are
modes of God, Spinoza means that all things inhere in God. Curley
embraces Bayle’s arguments against Spinoza, but uses them in order to
claim that we should not ascribe to Spinoza a view which is allegedly
shown by Bayle to be absurd. What we should do, Curley argues, is rein-
terpret the substance-mode relation as a relation of causal dependence,
which would set Spinoza free from Bayle’s hook. Interestingly, as we
shall soon see, Bayle himself discusses and rejects a very similar revision-
ary interpretation of the substance-mode relation.
1. Curley’s Interpretation of the Substance-Mode Relation in Spinoza
At the opening of the Ethics, Spinoza deﬁnes substance and mode in
the following manner.
E1d3: By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived
through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of
another thing, from which it must be formed [Per substantiam intelligo
id quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id cuius conceptus non indi-
get conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat].
E1d5: By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that
which is in another through which it is also conceived [Per modum in-
telligo substantiae aﬀectiones, sive id quod in alio est, per quod etiam
concipitur].
4 Bayle, Dictionary 296-97| Dictionaire V 210.
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A few lines further down, Spinoza presents his ﬁrst axiom:
E1a1: Whatever is, is either in itself or in another [Omnia, quae sunt,
vel in se, vel in alio sunt]
From these two deﬁnitions and axiom it follows that all things (‘‘what-
ever is’’) are either substances or modes of substances.5 In the middle
of the ﬁrst part of the Ethics, Spinoza proves that God is the only sub-
stance (‘‘Except God, no substance can be or be conceived’’ (E1p14)).
He thus concludes that all other things apart from God are God’s
modes:
Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without
God (E1p15).
This means that the Atlantic Ocean, Napoleon Bonaparte and every
rhinoceros are all in God, and are modes of God. The tradi-
tional understanding of this doctrine is that, for Spinoza, Napoleon,
rhinoceroses and all other modes inhere in God and are states of
God. This interpretation takes for granted that Spinoza’s contempo-
raries (primarily Descartes and his followers) share this understanding
of mode.
In Spinoza’s Metaphysics, Curley forcefully and interestingly chal-
lenged the interpretation of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza as
a relation of inherence. First, he argued, it was diﬃcult to make sense
of the claim that particular things, like Napoleon, are merely modes of
God:
Spinoza’s modes are, prima facie, of the wrong logical type to be
related to substance in the same way Descartes’ modes are related to
the substance, for they are particular things (E1p25c), not qualities.
And it is diﬃcult to know what it would mean to say that particular
things inhere in substance. When qualities are said to inhere in sub-
stance, this may be viewed as a way of saying that they are predicated
of it. What it would mean to say that one thing is predicated of
another is a mystery that needs solving.6
Already at this early stage it is important to note Curley’s interpreta-
tive strategy, particularly how he links the relations of inherence and
predication. In the third sentence of the passage Curley claims that
5 Note, however, that on the mode side of this dichotomy there might also be modes
of modes, as I will further point out later in this paper.
6 Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 18 (italics mine). Cf. Curley’s Behind the Geometrical
Method, 31.
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inherence ‘‘may be viewed’’ as a relation of predication. This clearly
allows for the possibility of other understandings (or other kinds) of
inherence. In the ﬁrst sentence of the passage, Curley hints that to con-
sider particular things as predicated of God is to make a category
mistake. Of course, one can avoid making the alleged category mistake
by rejecting the assimilation of inherence and predication (i.e., by hold-
ing that modes inhere in, but are not predicated of God). Curley rightly
points out that both Bayle and the British Idealist philosopher and
Spinoza scholar Harold Joachim make the same identiﬁcation and
understand modes to both inhere in and be predicated of God.7 The
approach that divorces inherence from predication has been nicely
developed in a number of recent studies.8 However, in this paper I will
defend the stronger claim that Spinozistic modes both inhere in and are
predicated of the substance.
Curley advances three further arguments, originally presented by
Pierre Bayle, that aim to show the absurdity of Spinoza’s metaphysics.9
I will present here the outline of these arguments. Further elucidation
will follow when we discuss their validity in § 4.
(i) If all things were modes, or properties, of God, then God,
the subject of all things, would have contradictory properties.
When we attribute properties to things or persons, what we
7 See Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 12–22. Cf. Curley’s ‘‘On Bennett’s Interpretation,’’ 1991,
p. 36. Indeed, Joachim is quite explicit in claiming that modes are states of the
substance and are predicated thereof: ‘‘We begin therefore with the anti-thesis of
Substance and its states or modiﬁcations—a more precise formulation of the popu-
lar antithesis of thing and properties, the metaphysical (though not coextensive) cor-
relate of the logical antithesis of subject and predicates (A Study of the Ethics of
Spinoza, 1901, p. 15). Bayle’s claims will be discussed below.
8 This strategy is developed in two important articles by Jarrett (‘‘The Concepts of
Substance and Mode in Spinoza,’’ 1977, where he states on page 85, ‘‘The diﬃ-
culty...can be solved by distinguishing inherence from predication, which is not
without precedent’’) and Carriero (‘‘On the Relationship between Mode and Sub-
stance in Spinoza,’’ 259). Note that both scholars suggest that modes are properties
of the substance but deny that the modes are predicated of the substance. Carriero
argues against the view that ‘‘the notion of a… particular property [is] absurd on
its face’’ (258) and considers Curley’s disregard for particular properties as one of
the main reasons for Curley’s going oﬀ track. For Carriero, Spinozistic modes are
particular properties. Jarrett concludes that ‘‘‘Being in’, as found in Spinoza,
expresses a relation of ontological dependence that is modeled after the dependence
of an ‘individual property’ on its bearer’’ (103, my emphasis). Both Jarrett and Car-
riero view modes as tropes, yet presumably both take predication to be a relation
which holds only between a universal (rather than a particular) property and the
subjects which have this property. Hence they deny that modes (qua particular
properties) are predicated of God. Cf. §6 below.
9 For Curley’s presentation and concise discussion of these arguments, see Spinoza’s
Metaphysics, 12–13.
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are really doing, according to Bayle’s understanding of
Spinoza, is attributing properties to God, insofar as the said
things or persons are in God:
[According to Spinoza] one would speak falsely when one said,
‘‘Peter denies this, he wants that, he afﬁrms such and such a thing’’;
for in actuality, according to [Spinoza], it is God who denies, wants,
afﬁrms.10
In nature, there are things whose properties are opposed to each other.
According to Bayle, these opposite properties should be attributed to
the one Spinozistic substance underlying all things, i.e., God. If, for
instance, Napoleon loves honey, while Josephine hates it, and if both
Napoleon and Josephine are modes of God, it will follow that ‘‘God
hates and loves, denies and afﬁrms, the same things, at the same time.’’
Thus, Bayle argues, Spinoza’s metaphysics violates the law of non-
contradiction.11
(ii) If particular things were modes of God, then God would
not be immutable.
The world we encounter is ﬁlled with particular things that are con-
stantly changing, and Spinoza does not seem to deny the reality of
change and motion.12 These things come into and out of being, and
change their properties. If these particulars were modes of God, God
would gain and lose modes, and thus be in motion.13 But if God
changes, claims Bayle, he is ‘‘not at all the supremely perfect being,
‘with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning’ (James
1:17).’’14 Following Bayle, Curley adds that God’s immutability is not
just a traditional theological view, but also a view openly endorsed by
10 Bayle, Dictionary 309-10 (Remark N)| Dictionaire, V 212. It is likely that Bayle’s
argument draws upon a similar argument of Malebranche, in which the latter
claims that concurrentism ascribes to God cooperation with contrary actions. See,
The Search after Truth, Elucidation Fifteen, p. 664.
11 Bayle, Dictionary 310 (Remark N)| Dictionaire, V 212. ‘‘Two contradictory terms
are then true of [God], which is the overthrow of the ﬁrst principles of metaphys-
ics.’’ (Ibid). Note that this argument is potent only against those who take Spino-
zistic modes to be predicated of God. The other two arguments of Bayle, discussed
below, can also target the view that Spinozistic modes inhere in, but are not predi-
cated of, God.
12 The reality of motion in Spinoza is supported by the fact that ‘Motion and rest’ is
the immediate inﬁnite mode of Extension (Letter 64).
13 ‘‘[T]he God of the Spinozist is a nature actually changing, and which continually
passes through diﬀerent states that diﬀer from one another internally and actually.’’
Bayle, Dictionary, 308| Dictionaire V 211.
14 Bayle, Dictionary, 308| Dictionaire V 211.
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Spinoza in E1p20c2.15 Hence, Curley argues, the inherence of modes
generates an internal inconsistency in Spinoza’s system.
(iii) If all things were modes of God, then God would be
directly responsible for all the evil in the world.
Traditional theology strives to explain how God can be the omnipotent
and omniscient cause of all things, and yet not be responsible for the
evil in the created world. According to Bayle, Spinoza’s view that all
things are modes of God connects God far more intimately to evil, and
makes him the real agent of all crimes.
Several great philosophers, not being able to comprehend how is it
consistent with the nature of the supremely perfect being to allow men
to be so wicked and miserable, have supposed two principles, one
good, and the other bad; and here is a Philosopher, who ﬁnds it good
that God be both the agent and the victim [le patient], of all the
crimes and miseries of man.16
In order to avoid these absurdities, so skillfully pointed out by Bayle,
Curley suggests that we should do away with the traditional interpreta-
tion of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza as a relation of inher-
ence. Curley proposes that in using the ‘substance-mode’ terminology
Spinoza primarily meant to point out a certain asymmetric dependence
of modes on the substance. While modes are entities that depend on
the substance and its attributes, the substance is a completely indepen-
dent entity. Preserving this asymmetric dependence by no means
requires that we conceive modes as inhering in the substance.17 The
very fact that modes are caused by the substance suﬃces to establish
this asymmetric dependence. Thus, the claim that Napoleon is a mode
of God should, according to Curley, amount to nothing over and
above the claim that God is the (eﬃcient) cause of Napoleon.18 Under
this interpretation, the claim that all things are modes of God appears
to be completely innocent (in fact, too innocent), insofar as it ascribes
to Spinoza a common theistic view, namely that God is just the cause
of all things.
15 Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 13.
16 Bayle, Dictionary, 311| Dictionaire, V 213.
17 Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 37.
18 ‘‘[T]he relation of mode to substance is one of causal dependence, not one of inher-
ence in a subject’’ (Curley, ‘‘On Bennett’s Interpretation,’’ 37). Cf. Spinoza’s Meta-
physics, 40: ‘‘[T]he relation of mode to substance is a relation of causal
dependence, which is unlike the relation of predicate and subject,’’ and Behind the
Geometrical Method, 31.
YITZHAK Y. MELAMED 23
Interestingly, Bayle explicitly addresses such an attempt to take Spi-
noza off the hook. In a remark added to the Spinoza article in the sec-
ond edition of the Dictionaire, Bayle responds to those who claim that
he ‘‘has not understood Spinoza’s theory at all.’’19 In particular, Bayle
addresses the claim of those who insist that
Spinoza only rejected the designation of ‘‘substance,’’ given to beings
dependent on another cause with respect to their production, their
conservation, and their operation.20 They could say that, while retain-
ing the entire reality of the thing, [Spinoza] avoids using the word,
because he thought that a being so dependent on its cause could not
be called ...’’ a being subsisting by itself’’ which is the deﬁnition of
substance.21
Bayle criticizes and rejects the view according to which Spinozistic
modes are equivalent to Cartesian ‘‘created substances’’ (that are caus-
ally dependent on God), rather than the Cartesian modes.22 In an iro-
nic concluding comment, Bayle announces his willingness to ‘‘admit’’
his mistake, if Spinoza indeed meant his modes to be the equivalent of
Cartesian ‘‘created substances.’’ If this is the case, says Bayle, then Spi-
noza is indeed ‘‘an orthodox philosopher who did not deserve to have
the objections made against him … and who only deserves to have
been reproached for having gone through so much trouble to embrace
a view that everyone knows.’’23 We will return to this important point
later. Let us ﬁrst complete our presentation of Curley’s view by brieﬂy
pointing out another component of his interpretation.
If, as Curley suggests, God is not the subject of inherence of all
things, then the common attribution of pantheism to Spinoza turns out
to be just another myth. Curley’s God is simply not identical with the
totality of nature. What then is God?
[Spinoza] rejected the notion of God as a personal creator and identi-
ﬁed God with (the attributes in which are inscribed) the fundamental
laws of nature, which provide the ultimate explanation for everything
that happens in nature. That is, he identiﬁes God with Nature, not
19 Bayle, Dictionary, 329 (Remark DD)| Dictionaire, V 222.
20 Descartes’ deﬁnition of substance, which is in the background of these claims, will
be discussed in the next section.
21 Bayle, Dictionary, 333 (Remark DD)| Dictionaire, V 224. Cf. ‘‘If [Spinoza] did not
want to ascribe the status of substance either to extension or to our souls, because
he believed that a substance is a being that does not depend on any cause, I admit
that I have attacked him without grounds, have attributed to him a view that he
does not hold’’ (Dictionary 332) Dictionaire, V 223.
22 Dictionary, 335 (Remark DD)| Dictionaire, V 224.
23 Bayle, Dictionary, 334 (Remark DD)| Dictionaire, V 224.
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conceived as the totality of things, but conceived as the most general
principles of order exempliﬁed by things. [Italics in original].24
Curley’s claim that God is just ‘‘the most general principle of order’’
is quite astonishing, since it seems to make God into a principle or
lex rather than an ens or res. Given the novelty of this daring claim,
one expects Curley to provide textual support (and a detailed expla-
nation of Spinoza’s understanding of the laws of nature). Curley
admits that such an understanding of God is hard to ﬁnd in the ﬁrst
part of the Ethics (where Spinoza lays out the foundations of his
metaphysics), yet Curley suggests that a later passage does support
his interpretation.
If you do not ﬁnd this as explicit as you might like it to be in Part 1
of the Ethics, consider what Spinoza writes in the Preface of Part III:
‘‘[N]ature is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are
everywhere one and the same i.e., the laws and rules of nature, accord-
ing to which all things happen, and change from one form to another,
are always and everywhere the same. So the way of understanding the
nature of anything, of whatever kind, must also be the same, viz.
through the universal laws and rules of nature.’’25
If I understand him correctly,26 Curley is taking the equivalence of
‘natura’ and ‘naturae leges et regulae’ (in the ﬁrst sentence of the pas-
sage) as implying the identiﬁcation of the two.27 But this is only one
possible way to explain the conjunction of terms. Alternative readings
can take the equivalence to suggest that the uniformity of nature is
24 Behind the Geometrical Method, 42–3.
25 Behind the Geometric Method, 42-3. The Latin text reads: ‘‘[Nihil in natura ﬁt, quod
ipsius vitio possit tribui;] est namque natura semper eadem et ubique una eademque
eius virtus et agendi potentia, hoc est, naturae leges et regulae, secundum quas omnia
ﬁunt et ex unis formis in alias mutantur, sunt ubique et semper eaedem, atque adeo
una eademque etiam debet esse ratio rerum qualiumcumque naturam intelligendi,
nempe per leges et regulas naturae universals.’’
26 One may cite Spinoza’s claim that the laws of nature are ‘‘inscribed in [the ﬁxed
and eternal things]’’ (TdIE, § 101) in support of an identiﬁcation of such laws with
the attributes (assuming—wrongly, I believe—that the ‘‘ﬁxed and eternal things’’
are attributes and not inﬁnite modes). The inscription metaphor, though indicating
an intimate relation between a thing and what is inscribed in it, does not support
the ascription of identity between the two things (the relation ‘x is inscribed in y’
seems to be asymmetric, unlike the identity relation).
27 In recent correspondence Curley notes that ‘‘actually what I take the passage to
identify are the laws of nature and nature’s virtue and power of acting.’’ Even if we
grant Curley’s point that the passage identiﬁes the laws of nature with nature’s vir-
tue and power of acting, this still falls far short of showing that Spinoza identiﬁes
God (or nature) with the laws of nature.
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identical to, or exempliﬁed by, the uniformity of the laws and rules of
nature, or even that the uniformity of ‘‘nature’s virtue and power of
acting’’ is identical to, or exempliﬁed by, the uniformity of the laws
and rules of nature.28 The textual source appears too equivocal to
support the bold suggestion that God is the most general law (or
principle) of nature.
One cluster of problems that this identiﬁcation faces is that it seems
not to ﬁt the characteristics Spinoza assigns to God. Take, for exam-
ple, indivisibility (E1pp12&13): what does it mean that a law is indi-
visible? Surprisingly, most of Curley’s critics have not targeted this
aspect of his interpretation.29 One can easily see why a twentieth (or
twenty-ﬁrst) century scholar would be tempted by such an interpretation.
It bestows upon Spinoza a certain aura of modernity and philosophical
respectability, yet as far as I can see (and I might well be wrong), it is
hard to ﬁnd it in the Ethics.30 In the following, I will concentrate my
discussion on Curley’s explanation of the substance-mode relation as a
causal relation, and leave aside the problematic identiﬁcation of God
with the most general law of nature, insofar as the former seems to me
not to depend on the validity of the latter.
Curley admits that although his interpretation ‘‘makes sense of a
great many passages in [Spinoza’s] work, it will not deal equally well
with all of them.’’31 The fact that his interpretation solves the problems
we have just discussed leads Curley to believe that the allegedly minor
28 Note that the context of this discussion is Spinoza’s claim that human beings and
their aﬀects are not a ‘‘dominion within dominion’’ in nature, but that the same
constancy and necessity which governs the rest of nature applies equally to the
human psyche.
29 Curley, however, is aware of the threat posed by God’s indivisibility (E1pp12-13)
to his interpretation. See Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 78.
30 In recent correspondence, Curley writes: ‘‘Assuming it’s permissible to cite passages
from the Theological-Political Treatise, I would cite from that work the passages
identifying the power of God with the power of Nature, and the latter power with
the laws of nature, such as TTP iii, 7-11, iv, 1-4, and vi, 1-12.’’ The texts Curley
cites seem to me important and relevant. They cannot be discussed here in detail,
but as far as I can see they are consistent with the TTP’s well-known claim that
the true laws of God are not religious commandments, but rather laws of nature.
Identifying divine with natural law is still not an identiﬁcation of God (or nature)
with either kind of law.
To what extent Spinoza’s view of natural laws (even the physical ones) is mod-
ern is a truly diﬃcult issue. Spinoza’s view of the nature of mathematical entities is
both surprising and diﬃcult. Spinoza arguably did not share Galileo’s (and Des-
cartes’) view that ‘‘the book of nature is written in mathematical script,’’ and it is
at least questionable whether he understood the laws of nature as quantitative (see
Gue´roult, ‘‘Spinoza’s Letter on the Inﬁnite,’’ 1973, Gilead, ‘‘The Order and Con-
nection of Things,’’ 1985, and Melamed, ‘‘On the Exact Science of Non-Beings:
Spinoza’s view of Mathematics,’’ 2000).
31 Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 78.
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discord between his interpretation and statements by Spinoza in other
texts is a price worth paying.
2. The Aristotelian and Cartesian Background of Spinoza’s Discussion
of Substance and Mode
Before we examine the validity of Curley’s interpretation it is impor-
tant to have a concise overview of the historical background of
Spinoza’s discussion of substance. This is so not only for the obvious
reason that Spinoza was not working in a void, but also because the
two competing theories of substance that were readily available to
Spinoza—those of Aristotle and Descartes—suggest the two main ways
of understanding Spinoza’s own concept of substance. Obviously, what
we can do here is only to provide a very general outline of these
delicate issues.
The two main loci for Aristotle’s discussion of substance are the
Categories, and the Metaphysics. In the Categories Aristotle discusses
substance [ousia] while explicating the ten categories of being, of which
substance is the ﬁrst and most important. Here is how Aristotle deﬁnes
substance:
A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, and most
of all—is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g.,
the individual man or the individual horse. The species in which the
things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances,
as also the genera of these species.32
For Aristotle, the term ‘substance’, in the full sense of the word,
applies only to particular things, such as a particular horse or a partic-
ular man. Whatever is not a particular thing can either be said of a
particular thing, or be in a particular thing. To the ﬁrst group belong
the genera and species under which particular things fall (such as
‘man’, ‘animal’, etc). The second group includes descriptions such as
‘red’ or ‘hot’ that do not constitute genera or species. In broad terms,
we can say that the distinction between being in and being said of a
thing is a distinction between accidental and essential predication.33
Now, Aristotle allows for the existence of secondary substances; these
are the genera and species which are said of (but are not in) the pri-
mary substances. Hence, whatever is not a primary substance depends
32 Categories, 2a12-2a17.
33 The further question of whether what is in a substance (such as whiteness) is
repeatable or not is a subject of major controversy among scholars. For two oppo-
site views see Ackrill (Aristotle, Categories and De Interpretatione, 1963), and Owen
(‘‘Inherence,’’ 1965).
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on a primary substance, since it has to either be in a primary sub-
stance, or be said of a primary substance.34
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle claims that the substratum [hypokeime-
non] ‘‘which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest
sense its substance.’’ The substratum itself is deﬁned as
[T]hat of which the other things are predicated, while it is not itself
predicated of anything else.35
Clearly the element which is stressed in the discussions of substance in
both the Categories and the Metaphysics is the independence of the sub-
stance, and in both texts this independence is cashed out in terms of
predication, i.e. (primary) substances do not depend on anything else of
which they are said to be predicated. Let us mark this understanding
of substance as the predication deﬁnition of substance: A is a (primary)
substance iﬀ it is a subject of predication36 and it is not predicated of
anything else.37
What is Descartes’ conception of substance? First, it is clear that the
Aristotelian deﬁnition of substance was not alien to Descartes’ contem-
poraries.38 Descartes himself, in the Second Set of Replies appended to
the Meditations, deﬁnes substance in terms that are quite close to Aris-
totle’s view:39
Substance. This term applies to every thing in which whatever we per-
ceive immediately resides, as in a subject, or to every thing by means
of which whatever we perceive exists. By ‘what we perceive’ is meant
34 For Aristotle, the relation y is said of x is transitive. Hence, the genus that is said
of an individual’s species is also (transitively) said of the individual itself.
35 Metaphysics VII (Z), 1028b36.
36 An interesting question, which I will not discuss here, is whether an Aristotelian
substance must have properties. On the one hand, if the substance were to have no
properties it would be unintelligible (in fact, it would be very much like an Aristo-
telian prime matter). On the other hand, if a substance must have properties, it
would make the substance dependent (admittedly, in a weak sense) on the proper-
ties, which seems to conﬂict with the independence of substance. Spinoza would
face a similar problem were he to explain why God must have modes.
37 For a detailed discussion of the Aristotelian and Scholastic understanding of sub-
stance and its relation to Spinoza’s views, see Carriero’s excellent article, ‘‘On the
Relationship between Mode and Substance in Spinoza.’’
38 See, for example, Arnauld and Nicole’s characterization of substance: ‘‘I call what-
ever is conceived as subsisting by itself and as the subject of everything conceived
about it, a thing. It is otherwise called a substance (Logic or the Art of Thinking,
Part I, Chapter 2 (p. 30 in Buroker’s translation).
39 Cf. Rozemond (Descartes’s Dualism, 1998, p. 7) for a similar stress on the continu-
ity between the Scholastic and Cartesian views of substance.
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any property, quality or attribute of which we have a real idea (CSM
II, 114)
Unlike Aristotle’s characterization of primary substance, Descartes’
does not stipulate that a substance should not be predicated of any-
thing else.40 Yet it is clear that what makes something a substance is
the fact that it is a subject of which properties are predicated. Follow-
ing his deﬁnition of substance, Descartes deﬁnes God as ‘‘the substance
which we understand to be supremely perfect, and in which we con-
ceive absolutely nothing that implies any defect or limitation in that
perfection’’ (CSM II, 114). What is interesting in this deﬁnition is that
in spite of the fact that it makes God supremely perfect, it does not say
that God is more of a substance than other (ﬁnite) substances. Such a
distinction between God, the only substance in the strict sense of the
word, and ﬁnite substances does appear in Descartes’ most famous dis-
cussion of the topic, in section 51 of the ﬁrst part of the Principles:
By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which
exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence.
And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend
on no other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other
substances, we perceive that they can exist only with the help of God’s
concurrence. Hence the term ‘substance’ does not apply univocally, as
they say in the Schools, to God and to other things; that is, there is
no distinctly intelligible meaning of the term which is common to
God and his creatures. (In the case of created things, some are of such
a nature that they cannot exist without other things, while some need
only the ordinary concurrence of God in order to exist. We make this
distinction by calling the latter ‘substances’ and the former ‘qualities’
or ‘attributes’ of those substances.) (CSM I, 210)
Several prominent scholars suggest that in this passage Descartes intro-
duced a new deﬁnition of substance as an ‘independent being.’ This,
I believe, is somewhat imprecise, since the independence of substance is
also stressed by Aristotle. Where Descartes diverges from Aristotle is in
the way he cashes out this independence. While for Aristotle the inde-
pendence of (primary) substance is deﬁned solely in terms of predica-
tion, Descartes stipulates that substance in the full sense of the word
must also be causally independent. Hence, in addition to being self-sub-
sisting, a full-ﬂedged Cartesian substance must also ﬁt the causation
40 In fact, in the Sixth Set of Replies, Descartes seems to allow for one substance to
be predicated of another substance, though only in a loose manner of speaking
(CSM II, 293). We will return to this text when we discuss the question of whether
the traditional interpretation of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza ascribes to
Spinoza a category mistake.
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stipulation of substance: ‘x is a (full-ﬂedged) substance only if it is not
caused by anything else.’ Created substances are self-subsisting, yet
externally caused by God. As a result, they are not substances in the
full sense of the word.
This brings us to an interesting asymmetry between causation and
predication in Descartes’ view of substance. While Descartes is willing
to grant the title ‘substance’ to things which are causally dependent
only on God, he does not seem to be willing to make the same com-
promise with regard to predication. Things which depend only on God
in terms of predication (i.e., God’s attributes) are not recognized in this
passage (or, as far as I know, in any other text of Descartes) as sub-
stances even in the weaker sense of the word (i.e., as being dependent
only on God).41 This seems to indicate that even for Descartes, the sine
qua non condition for substantiality is still independence in terms of pred-
ication (i.e., self-subsistence), and only once this necessary condition is
satisﬁed, causal self-suﬃciency distinguishes between God, the substance
in the full sense of the word, and ﬁnite, created substances.42
What are Cartesian modes? Shortly after presenting his deﬁnition of
substance in Principles I, 51, Descartes deﬁnes mode as ‘‘what is else-
where meant by an attribute or quality.’’ Yet attributes, as opposed to
modes, are general and unchanging characteristics of substances (Prin-
ciples I, 56).43 Modes are also asymmetrically dependent on their sub-
stance, both for their existence and for their conceivability.44
Later in this paper we will discuss further issues in Descartes’ view
of substance (such as the question of whether for Descartes there is
41 Of course, for Descartes the distinction between a substance and its principal attri-
bute (i.e., the attribute which constitutes its essence) is only a distinction of reason.
Still, this does not make God’s attributes into substances (at least no more than
the attributes of any ﬁnite substance).
42 In the Third Set of Replies Descartes suggests that reality (or thinghood) admits of
degrees: ‘‘A substance is more of a thing than a mode; if there are real qualities or
incomplete substances, they are things to a greater extent than modes, but to a
lesser extent than complete substances; and, ﬁnally, if there is an inﬁnite and inde-
pendent substance, it is more of a thing than a ﬁnite and dependent substance’’
(CSM II 130). The ‘‘ﬁnite substances’’ of the third set of replies are presumably the
‘‘created substances’’ of Principles I, 51. This text also accepts self-subsistence as
the sine qua non criterion of being a substance.
43 On the distinction between attributes and modes, see Comments on a Certain
Broadsheet (CSM I 297| AT VIIIB 348). Cf. Garber (Descartes’ Metaphysical
Physics, 1992, p. 65) for an illuminating discussion of the development of the
distinction between attribute and mode in Descartes’ later work.
44 For the conceptual dependence of modes on their substances, see Descartes’ Princi-
ples I, 61 (CSM I 214| AT VIIIA 29) and Comments on a Certain Broadsheet (CSM
I 298| AT VIIIB 35). For the ontological dependence of modes or accidents on
their substances, see Descartes’ Fifth Set of Replies (CSM II 251| AT VII 364). Cf.
Sixth Set of Replies (CSM II 293| AT VII 435).
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only one or many extended substances). But before we return to our
main issue—the substance-mode relation in Spinoza—let’s see how
Curley would relate to this Aristotelian and Cartesian background.
From the point of view of Curley’s interpretation,45 Descartes repre-
sents the crucial middle link in the transition from substance as a self-
subsisting being (the Aristotelian notion of substance) to substance as
causally independent being (the Spinozistic view of substance according
to Curley). According to this historical scheme, Descartes begins a
move (the introduction of the causal notion of substance) which is
completed by Spinoza (in the elimination of self-subsistence from the
deﬁnition of substance).
3. Arguments Against Curley’s Interpretation.
Curley’s bold thesis has drawn substantial and interesting criticism over
the years. In what follows I will point out and further develop three
arguments of Curley’s critics that I ﬁnd powerful. Later I will add
some further arguments, which I believe are presented here for the ﬁrst
time.
3.1 Pantheism
One crucial implication of Curley’s interpretation is that Spinoza’s
famous pantheism is a myth.46 According to Curley, Spinoza identiﬁes
God not with nature simpliciter, but with Natura naturans, the active
aspect of nature which includes substance and its attributes. Natura
naturata, the passive aspect of nature and the domain of modes, is,
according to Curley, caused by God, but is not God.47 This view does
not easily make sense of Spinoza’s reference to Deus sive Natura
(E4pref and E4p4d), by which he seems to identify God with nature
45 Curley concentrates on the Cartesian background of Spinoza’s understanding of
substance, suggesting that the Cartesian distinction between substance and mode
‘‘involved two elements: a distinction between independent and dependent being
and a distinction between subject and predicate’’ (Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 37). Spi-
noza, according to Curley, adopts only the ﬁrst Cartesian distinction. As I men-
tioned earlier, I believe that the independence ⁄ dependence dichotomy underlies
both distinctions, which diﬀer in terms of their explication of the independence of
substance and dependence of modes. Curley hardly deals with the Aristotelian dis-
cussion of substance. Hence, the present paragraph presents what I believe Curley
should have said had he examined Spinoza’s view against the background of both
Aristotle and Descartes. In fact, a very similar historical scheme appears in Gue´ro-
ult, though Gue´roult does not deny that Spinozistic modes are also qualities of
substance (Spinoza I, 1968, p. 63).
46 See Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 42 and Curley, ‘‘On Bennett’s Interpretation,’’
45.
47 Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 19.
YITZHAK Y. MELAMED 31
(and not just with Natura naturans). Similarly, it would make little
sense for Curley’s Spinoza to say that there is nothing outside God, a
claim which Spinoza repeats more than once.48
Yet Curley interestingly argues that in the key passage in the Ethics,
in which Spinoza oﬃcially introduces the distinction between Natura
naturans and Natura naturata, he identiﬁes God only with the former.49
[B]y Natura naturans we must understand what is in itself and is con-
ceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an
eternal and inﬁnite essence, i.e. [hoc est] (by P14C1 and P17C2), God,
insofar as he is considered as a free cause.
But by Natura naturata I understand whatever follows from the neces-
sity of God’s nature, or from any of God’s attributes, i.e., all the
modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things
which are in God, and can neither be nor be conceived without God
(E1p29s).
At ﬁrst sight, the deﬁnition of Natura naturans as ‘‘God insofar as he is
considered as a free cause’’ seems to provide a clear endorsement of
Curley’s position. Yet when we read it more closely, it turns out, I
believe, to make quite the opposite point. According to the passage,
Natura naturans is not God simpliciter, but rather ‘‘God, insofar as he
is considered as a free cause’’ [Deus, quatenus, ut causa libera, consider-
atur].50 Why would Curley’s Spinoza qualify the identity of God and
Natura naturans? If Natura naturans is identical with God only ‘‘insofar
as he is considered as a free cause,’’ it is at least possible that in
another respect, God is not identical with Natura naturans.
At several places in the Ethics, Spinoza speaks of God ‘‘not insofar
as he is inﬁnite’’ (see, for example, E4p4d).51 He apparently uses this
roundabout language because he feels uncomfortable describing God
as ﬁnite or compelled. Yet Spinoza leaves no doubt that he takes ﬁnite
48 See, for example, KV I, ii (I ⁄ 26 ⁄ 17); KV I, iii (I ⁄ 35 ⁄ 19), and the NS version of
E1p18d (‘‘God is not a cause of anything outside him’’ [C 428, n. 52]). Similarly, in
Letter 75, when Spinoza answers Oldenburg’s persistent queries about his true view
of Christ, he replies with words that could hardly be interpreted in a non-pantheis-
tic manner: ‘‘I will add only this.... that God is not in any one place but is every-
where in accordance with his essence, that matter is everywhere the same, that God
does not manifest himself in some imaginary space beyond the world.’’ (Ep. 75|
Shirley 338).
49 Curley, ‘‘On Bennett’s Interpretation,’’ 47. Cf. Behind the Geometrical Method, 37,
42-3.
50 Michael Della Rocca makes this point in his unpublished manuscript, ‘‘Predication
and Pantheism in Spinoza’’.
51 In ‘‘Predication and Pantheism in Spinoza,’’ Della Rocca discusses E2p9 in this
context and cites E2p9c, E2p12d, E2p19d and E2p20d, as further examples. My
argument, though aiming at the same conclusion, relies on E1p28.
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modes to be God in some sense or respect.52 One such text is E1p29d,
the demonstration that comes just before E1p29s (where Spinoza intro-
duces the distinction between Natura naturans and Natura naturata):
[T]he modes of the divine nature have also followed from [the divine
nature] necessarily and not contingently (by P16)—either [vel] insofar
as the divine nature is considered absolutely (by P21) or insofar as the
divine nature is considered to be determined to act in a certain way
(by P28).
In E1p21, Spinoza discusses the immediate inﬁnite modes which ‘‘fol-
low the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes.’’ These are the
modes which follow from the divine nature ‘‘insofar as he is considered
absolutely’’ (E1p29d). But what is the divine nature insofar as it ‘‘is
considered to be determined to act in a certain way’’? Let’s look at
E1p28, the proposition Spinoza cites in support of this claim.
E1p28 attempts to explain how God can be considered the cause of
ﬁnite modes. In E1p21, Spinoza states and proves that the modes which
follow directly from God, or the attributes, are inﬁnite.53 In E1p22, he
proves that only inﬁnite modes can follow from inﬁnite modes.54 This
leaves us wondering in what sense God is said to be the cause of the ﬁnite
modes (as E1p16&c1 and E1p25 claim). Spinoza answers:
Whatever has been determined to exist and produce an effect has been
so determined by God (by P26 and P24C). But what is ﬁnite and has
a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute
nature of an attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute
nature of an attribute of God is eternal and inﬁnite (by P21).55 It had,
therefore, to follow either from God or from an attribute of God
insofar as it is considered to be aﬀected by some mode. For there is
nothing except substance and its modes (by A1, D3, and D5) and
52 In a somewhat surprising response, Curley writes recently (in correspondence):
‘‘I’m willing to accept that formula, so long as its vagueness is not repaired by
interpreting it as implying that ﬁnite modes are parts of God (an interpretation I
take to be ruled out by IP13S).’’ I deﬁnitely do not think that ﬁnite modes are parts
of God (see the discussion of substance-mode pantheism as opposed to whole-part
pantheism at the end of §5 below). Hence it seems that the gap between our posi-
tions is considerably reduced.
53 ‘‘E1p21: All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God’s attri-
butes have always had to exist and be inﬁnite, or are, through the same attribute,
eternal and inﬁnite.’’
54 ‘‘E1p22: Whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modiﬁed by
a modiﬁcation which, through the same attribute, exists necessarily and is inﬁnite,
must also exist necessarily and be inﬁnite.’’
55 The ‘‘absolute nature of an attribute’’ is the attribute when it is not modiﬁed at all.
What ‘‘follows from the absolute nature’’ of God is an immediate inﬁnite mode of
the same attribute.
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modes (byP25c) are nothing but aﬀections of God’s attributes. But it
also could not follow from God, or from an attribute of God, insofar
as it is aﬀected by a modiﬁcation which is eternal and inﬁnite (by
P22). It had, therefore, to follow from, or to be determined to exist
and produce an eﬀect by God or an attribute of God insofar as it is
modiﬁed by a modiﬁcation which is ﬁnite and has a determinate exis-
tence. (E1p28d, emphasis mine).
God, ‘‘insofar as it is modiﬁed by modiﬁcation which is ﬁnite and has a
determinate existence,’’ is clearly not Natura naturans, since the latter is
neither ﬁnite nor has a determinate existence. This passage leaves little
doubt that to follow from a ﬁnite mode of God is to follow from God.
This is, in fact, the whole point of the demonstration of E1p28. Since
ﬁnite modes can follow only from ﬁnite modes, God has to be the ﬁnite
modes (‘‘God insofar as it is modiﬁed by modiﬁcation which is ﬁnite’’) if
he is to be the cause of all things, including ﬁnite modes.56 Hence, we
must conclude that insofar as God ‘‘is considered as a free cause’’ he is
Natura naturans, but insofar as he ‘‘is modiﬁed by a modiﬁcation which
is ﬁnite and has a determinate existence,’’ God is Natura naturata. Thus,
if pantheism is the view that identiﬁes God with nature (i.e., with all
aspects of nature), Spinoza is a pantheist.57
3.2 The Deﬁnition of ‘Mode’
Curley’s interpretation makes some of Spinoza’s formulations highly
misleading. Particularly disturbing is the fact that Curley’s Spinoza
must have been careless not only in his casual writing about the sub-
stance-mode relation, but even the very deﬁnition of mode seems to be
poorly formulated. The deﬁnition (E1d5) reads
By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is
in another through which it is also conceived [Per modum intelligo sub-
stantiae aﬀectiones, sive id quod in alio est, per quod etiam concipitur].58
56 Curley believes that ﬁnite modes follow both from God and from other ﬁnite
modes, and he might respond by suggesting that God is the cause of ﬁnite modes
only insofar as he is the cause of certain inﬁnite modes which include the ﬁnite
mode. The argument of E1p28d shows clearly that Spinoza’s view is much stronger
and that he takes God to be the cause of every ﬁnite mode in its particularity. This
is fulﬁlled by taking ﬁnite mode x which causes ﬁnite mode y as God ‘‘modiﬁed by
a modiﬁcation which is ﬁnite.’’
57 In the Fourth Chapter of the TTP Spinoza writes: ‘‘So the whole of our knowl-
edge, that is our supreme good, not merely depends on the knowledge of God but
consists entirely therein [sed in eadem omnino consistit]’’ (G III ⁄ 60 ⁄ 11-13| S 50).
This seems to indicate that Spinoza embraced pantheism at least as early as the
1660s, while he was writing the TTP.
58 Cf. Ep. 12 (IV ⁄ 54 ⁄ 9| Shirley 102): ‘‘The aﬀections of Substance I call Modes.’’
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According to Curley this deﬁnition amounts to nothing over and
above the claim that modes are causally dependent on something
else. Interestingly, this deﬁnition (as well as the deﬁnition of sub-
stance) does not at all mention the term ‘cause’ [causa]. For the time
being, let’s just note that it appears somewhat odd that a philoso-
pher who makes an extremely powerful and extensive use of the
notion of causality fails to mention it in the place where it, presum-
ably, most belongs. How does Curley infer causal dependence from
the deﬁnition of mode? Presumably, it is the ‘‘in alio est’’ phrase in
E1d5 which Curley understands as designating the causal dependence
of modes.59 However, another question emerges: why deﬁne modes
as aﬀections? Bennett rightly points out that the Latin ‘aﬀectio’
means ‘‘quality, or property or state.’’60 Even if Spinoza used aﬀectio
in an idiosyncratic sense,61 it would still seem to be redundant, since
59 It would be unreasonable for Curley to interpret the ‘conceived through another’
clause of the deﬁnition of mode as designating the causal dependence of modes,
since in such a case he would have to address two problems. Firstly, he would have
to explain the ‘in alio est‘ clause. Secondly, he would have to point out a textual
source for the conceptual dependence of modes.
60 Bennett, Study, 1984, p. 93. Cf. Bennett, Six Philosophers, Vol. I, 2001, p. 142. Cf.
Garrett, ‘‘Spinoza’s conatus argument,’’ 2002, p. 135. That Spinoza understands
‘aﬀections’ to be properties one can see in the following passage from the Cogitata
Metaphysica where Spinoza deﬁnes aﬀections as the attributes of a thing.
‘‘The deﬁnition of aﬀections: Let us, therefore, attend to our own business. We say
that aﬀections of being are certain attributes, under which we understand the
essence or existence of each thing, [the attributes,] nevertheless, being distinguished
from [being] only by reason. I shall try here to explain certain things concerning
these attributes (for I do not undertake to treat them all), and also to distinguish
them from denominations, which are aﬀections of no being.’’ (I ⁄ 240 ⁄ 15-20| C 306).
It is not clear to me whether in this early text ‘attribute’ designates every property
of a real thing, or only the properties which constitute the essence of a thing. The
claim that the attributes ‘‘are distinguished from being only by reason’’ seems to
support the latter. In any case, it is clear, I think, that attributes—and hence also
aﬀections—are taken here as properties.
61 Here I agree with Bennett’s view that according to Curley’s interpretation, ‘‘Spi-
noza has deﬁned ‘mode’ just about as misleadingly as he could possibly have done’’
(Study, 93). Curley would have to explain many passages in Spinoza’s works where
‘aﬀectus’ seems to indicate inherence (and predication). Here are three examples. 1)
One group of texts where ‘aﬀection’ clearly involves inherence is in Spinoza’s dis-
cussion of the aﬀection of the body in part three of the Ethics. See, for example,
E3p32s: ‘‘the images of things are the very aﬀections of the human Body, or modes
by which the human Body is aﬀected by external causes, and disposes to do this
or that.’’ Would Curley deny that images of things are in the human body? 2) In
Letter 12 Spinoza claims that ‘‘from the fact that we separate the aﬀections of Sub-
stance from Substance itself, and arrange them in classes so that we can easily
imagine them, there arises Number’’ (IV ⁄ 57 ⁄ 3-4| S 104. Italics mine). For Spinoza,
numbers are merely ‘‘aids of the imagination’’ and our knowledge of numbers
belongs to the distorting ﬁrst kind of knowledge (see Gue´roult, ‘‘Spinoza’s Letter
on the Inﬁnite,’’ and Ramond, Qualite´ et quantite´ dans la philosophie de Spinoza,
1995). If our (distorted) conception of number results from the separation of
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the idea of the modes’ dependence is clearly stated in the rest of the
deﬁnition (i.e., that the mode is ‘‘in another’’). Why then add the
misleading claim (according to Curley’s account of Spinoza) that
modes are substantiae aﬀectiones?
3.3 E1p15 and E1p16
We have seen that according to Curley the substance-mode relation
amounts to nothing over and above the asymmetric dependence of an
effect on its cause. Now, in E1p15, Spinoza states and proves that all
things are modes of God:
Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without
God [Quicquid est in Deo est, et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi
potest]
In the following proposition, Spinoza states and proves that
From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow inﬁnitely
many things in inﬁnitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall
under an inﬁnite intellect) (E1p16).
And from E1p16, Spinoza derives E1p16c1:
From this it follows that God is the efﬁcient cause of all things which
can fall under an inﬁnite intellect [Hinc sequitur, Deum omnium rerum,
quae sub intellectum inﬁnitum cadere possunt, esse causam eﬃcientem].
Both Jarrett and Carriero make the cogent point that if, the substance-
mode relation amounts to nothing over and above causation, it would
affections from substance, it would seem that otherwise these affections are not
separate from substance. 3) Further on in the same letter Spinoza argues that if one
thinks that there is a deﬁnite number for all the motions of matter that have ever been
(i.e., if one thinks that matter could exist prior to the beginning of movement), ‘‘he
would surely be attempting to deprive [privare] corporeal Substance, which we cannot
conceive other than existing, of its aﬀections, and to bring it about that Substance
should not posses the nature that it does posses’’ (IV ⁄ 60 ⁄ 12-15| Shirley 106. Emphasis
mine). If the aﬀections at stake are non-essential properties of the substance, we can, I
think, make sense of these claims. The argument seems to be roughly this: if the
number of motions till now were ﬁnite, it would seem that before the earliest
movement, substance existed without having a multiplicity of modes (assuming that
the multiplicity of modes can only result from change and motion). Spinoza rejects this
possibility by insisting that the substance cannot exist without its modes. This
explanation follows the traditional understanding of modes and aﬀections as inhering
in the substance. But, if we accept Curley’s view, it is not clear what kind of removal
(‘‘deprive corporeal Substance…of its aﬀections’’) is at stake and why such a removal
of (what Curley considers to be merely) an eﬀect of the substance should make the
substance ‘‘not posses the nature that it does posses.’’
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seem odd for Spinoza to state this relation in E1p15 and repeat it
(redundantly) in E1p16c1, without making the slightest claim that
E1p16c1 (or E1p16) is derived from, or is a restatement of, E1p15.
Moreover, in his later references to the two propositions Spinoza does
not seem to treat the two propositions as equivalent.62
I ﬁnd the aforementioned arguments quite convincing. I wish to add
the following points.
3.4 Can Curley’s God Know Anything?
One underlying concern for Curley is to secure Spinoza’s ‘‘impersonal
conception of God, according to which God will have nothing in com-
mon with man, but will have enough in common with the God of the
Philosophers to justiﬁably be called God.’’63 Though one may doubt
whether the phrase ‘‘the God of the Philosophers’’ has any univocal
meaning, I think Curley’s main point is deﬁnitely right. Spinoza con-
sciously attempts to preserve some continuity between the philosophical
terminology with which he was acquainted and his own philosophical
terminology.64 One attribute which is traditionally ascribed to God is
omniscience, and in E2p3 and E2p4 Spinoza seems to ascribe omni-
science to God. Yet when we carefully examine Curley’s understanding
of the substance-mode relation, it leads, I believe, to the conclusion
that not only is Curley’s God not omniscient, but that this God is com-
pletely ignorant.
Spinoza arguably accepts the following two theses:
(1) A has knowledge of x, iff she has an idea of x.65
(2) All ideas are modes of Thought.66
From which we can infer that,
(3) If God has knowledge of x, God must have a mode of Thought.
62 See Jarrett (‘‘The Concept of Substance and Mode in Spinoza,’’ 92) and Carriero
(‘‘On the Relation Between Mode and Substance in Spinoza’s Metaphysics,’’ 255-
6).
63 Curley, ‘‘On Bennett’s Interpretation,’’ 40.
64 In an important note in the third part of the Ethics (Deﬁnitions of Aﬀects, 20),
Spinoza lets his readers know that although his use of philosophical terms does not
necessarily follow the common use, his terminology still ‘‘is not entirely opposed’’
to the common usage.
65 In E2p7d Spinoza rephrases E1a4 by replacing ‘knowledge’ [cognitio] with ‘idea’. In
several other places he treat the ‘‘idea or [sive] knowledge’’ (of an item) as equiva-
lent terms. See, for example, E2p19d: ‘‘God has the idea of the human body, or
knows the human body’’). Cf. E2p20d, E2p23d, Ep. 72 (Shirley 290).
66 See the end of E2a3: ‘‘[T]here can be an idea, even though there is no other mode
of thinking’’ (Emphasis mine).
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Now, what does ‘having a mode of Thought’ mean? According to the
traditional understanding of the substance-mode relation it means that
ideas (modes of Thought) inhere in God. According to Curley it means
that God is merely the cause of certain ideas. Since Curley agrees with
Bayle’s claim that having modes (in the traditional sense) entails muta-
bility, he would have to deny that any idea inheres in God. Hence,
Curley’s God has no ideas—and no knowledge—within himself. All
that Curley’s God does is to cause or produce ideas. But to say that
when someone produces an idea of x, she has knowledge of x, seems to
be an extremely odd criterion for knowledge. Prima facie, it seems that
Curley makes God know things without endowing him with any inter-
nal mentality or representational capacities.
Can Spinoza accept a God that is ignorant? In numerous places Spi-
noza assigns to God thinking [cogitans], knowledge [cognitio], and
understanding [intelligere].67 It is hard to make sense of claims that
God thinks, knows and understands while denying that God has any
ideas within him.
3.5 Inherence in Letter 12
Though Spinoza does not frequently use the term ‘inherence’ [inhaereo],
he does use it at a very crucial moment. At the end of his discussion of
kinds of inﬁnities in Letter 12, Spinoza writes:
From all that I have said one can clearly see that certain things are
inﬁnite by their own nature and cannot in any way be conceived as
ﬁnite, while other things are inﬁnite by virtue of the cause in which
they inhere [causae cui inhaerent]; and when they are conceived in
abstraction, they can be divided into parts and be regarded as ﬁnite.
[IV ⁄ 60 ⁄ 17-61 ⁄ 3| Shirley 106]
I cannot dwell here on Spinoza’s complicated and intriguing taxonomy
of inﬁnities. Yet it is not difﬁcult to see that what is at stake in this
passage is the distinction between attributes and inﬁnite modes. In Spi-
noza’s ontology, the only inﬁnite things that can ‘‘have a cause in
which they inhere’’ are the inﬁnite modes. Attributes do not have
causes (apart from themselves), and they are far too closely related to
their substance to inhere in it.68 Attributes are also indivisible (E1p12).
Spinoza’s main point in this passage is that while both attributes
and inﬁnite modes are inﬁnite, their inﬁnities are of different kinds and
have opposite characteristics. The inﬁnity of attributes is due to their
67 See, for example, E2p3s and E2p5d.
68 For Spinoza, like Descartes, the distinction between a substance and its attributes
is only a distinction of reason.
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nature, or deﬁnition (see E1d4), and is absolutely indivisible. The inﬁn-
ity of inﬁnite modes has nothing to do with the nature, or deﬁnition,
of a mode, but rather results from the fact that it inheres in (and is
caused by) the inﬁnite substance (or, as Spinoza puts it in E1p22-23, it
‘‘follows’’ from an attribute).
It is important to stress that this passage cannot be explained away
as a marginal text, since we know that even in his late period Spinoza
kept circulating copies of this important letter among his friends.69
3.6 ‘‘In Deo Moveri’’
In Letter 71, Henry Oldenburg, the secretary of the Royal Society in
London, asks Spinoza ‘‘to elucidate and moderate those passages in
the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, which have proved a stumbling-
block to readers.’’ Oldenburg was particularly concerned about the pas-
sages which ‘‘appear to treat in an ambiguous way of God and Nature,
which many people consider you have confused with each other.’’70 To
this charge Spinoza replies in Letter 73:
I entertain an opinion on God and Nature far different from that
which modern Christians are wont to uphold. I maintain that God is
the immanent cause, as the phrase is, of all things, and not the transi-
tive cause. All things, I say, are in God and move in God [in Deo esse
& in Deo moveri], and this I aﬃrm together with Paul and perhaps
together with all the ancient philosophers, though expressed in a dif-
ferent way, and I would even venture to say together with all the
ancient Hebrews, as far as may be conjectured from certain traditions,
though these have suﬀered much corruption. However, as to the view
of certain people that the Tractatus Thelogico-Politicus rests on the
identiﬁcation of God with Nature (by the latter of which they under-
stand a kind of mass or corporeal matter) they are quite mistaken [S
332. My emphases.]
The last sentence of the passage may appear at ﬁrst as a rejection of
pantheism. But a deeper look proves the opposite. The sentence does
not reject any identiﬁcation of God with Nature, but only the identiﬁ-
cation of God with Nature considered as ‘‘mass or corporeal matter.’’
The latter identiﬁcation is faulty for Spinoza on two counts. First, it
ascribes to God only one attribute, Extension, while, for Spinoza,
Thought and all the other attributes are by no means less real than
Extension. Second, even the identiﬁcation of Extension with ‘‘mass or
corporeal matter’’ is imprecise. In Letter 81, Spinoza criticizes
69 See Ep. 81 (Shirley 352).
70 Ep. 71 (IV ⁄ 304 ⁄ 9-11|Shirley 329).
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Descartes precisely because the latter conceives Extension as ‘‘an inert
mass.’’71
When we turn our attention to the rest of the passage, it seems to
present two signiﬁcant challenges to Curley’s interpretation. First, Spi-
noza’s claim that ‘‘all things move in God’’ seems to be unintelligible
on Curley’s reading. Second, on Curley’s reading it is hard to ﬁgure
out why Spinoza invokes the ‘‘ancient philosophers’’ as supporters of
the view that all things are in God, since this doctrine—which, accord-
ing to Curley, means only that all things are caused by God—was
accepted by virtually all of Spinoza’s contemporaries. I have already
pointed out that Curley’s interpretation of the substance-mode relation
in causal terms brings Spinoza much closer to the good old theist posi-
tion. Why then invoke the distant shadows of the Eleatics, the Stoics,
and the mysterious traditions of ‘‘the Ancient Hebrews’’?72
This passage cannot easily be explained away either, since it appears
in one of Spinoza’s last letters, reﬂecting his mature thought.
3.7 Immanent Cause
Both in the Ethics and in his other writings Spinoza suggests an impor-
tant distinction between immanent [causa immanens| inblijvende oorzaak]
and transient cause [causa transiens| overgaande oorzaak], and stresses
that ‘‘God is the immanent and not the transitive cause of all things’’
(E1p18d). Spinoza’s main discussion of this distinction appears in the
Short Treatise, and it seems to me undeniable that in this text the claim
that God is the immanent cause of all things means that all things are
within God.
In the Short Treatise Spinoza characterizes an immanent cause as
one in which the agent and the one acted on are not diﬀerent,73 in
which the agent ‘‘acts on himself,’’74 whose eﬀect ‘‘is not outside
71 Ep. 81 (Shirley 352). Of course, Spinoza intentionally phrases these lines (in Letter
71) so that a naive reader would take it as a rejection of pantheism. Given the
political context of his writing this seems to be a reasonable practice.
72 It is quite likely that these ‘‘ancient Hebrew’’ traditions [traditionibus] are nothing
but the pantheistic teachings of the Kabbalah. In pre-modern Hebrew, the word
‘Kabbalah’ means tradition. It was a common practice of the medieval Kabbalists
to attribute their works to ancient sources. (These claims have conventionally been
approached with skepticism, though recent studies of the Kabbalistic literature sug-
gest that some sources of the main Kabbalistic works might indeed go back to pre-
medieval times). Spinoza’s reference to the corruption of these traditions is in line
with the views of some early modern Jewish philosophers such as Salomon Mai-
mon and Moses Mendelssohn, who saw the Kabbalah as founded upon a rational-
ist (one may say, Neo-Platonic) core, which was enveloped in, and corrupted by,
its mythical presentation.
73 KV I, ii [I ⁄ 26 ⁄ 19| C 72].
74 KV I, ii [I ⁄ 26 ⁄ 25| C 72].
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itself,’’75 and in which the eﬀect is part of the cause.76 A transitive (or
transient) cause has precisely the opposite characteristics. Spinoza’s
paradigmatic example of an immanent cause is the relation of an intel-
lect to the concepts which constitute it.77 These claims make clear that
the eﬀects of an immanent cause are within the cause.
The two other places where Spinoza discusses immanent cause are Let-
ter 73 and the Ethics. Does Spinoza’s understanding of immanent cause
in these two later texts involve the thesis that its eﬀect is not within the
cause? We have no indication which supports this possibility. On the con-
trary, when we look carefully at the relevant passage of Letter 73 (see the
quotation above) we ﬁnd that Spinoza interrupts himself with a short
remark indicating that he is not using the notion in any new manner: ‘‘I
maintain that God is the immanent cause, as the phrase is, of all things,
and not the transitive cause’’ (emphasis mine).
The Ethics passage simply states that all things are in God,78 and at
ﬁrst sight may appear to provide no proof either for or against Curley’s
interpretation. But why should we ascribe to Spinoza a change in the use
of his terminology when there is no indication that such a change took
place (and, when a very late text, Letter 73 (1675), seems to indicate a
continuity in Spinoza’s use of this terminology)? Let’s look closely at
E1p18 where Spinoza proves that God is the immanent cause of all
things. The demonstration of E1p18 proceeds in two stages. First,
Spinoza points out that according to E1p15 all things are in God, and
then relies on E1p16c to show that God is the (eﬃcient) cause of all
things. Thus, an immanent cause is just an eﬃcient cause whose eﬀect is
in the cause. A transitive cause is an (eﬃcient) cause whose eﬀect is not in
the cause (or is outside the cause). But can Curley allow for such a
notion? Recall that it was Curley’s reading of E1d3&5 that ‘to be in x’ is
just to be caused by x? If so, then the notion of transitive cause turns out
to be a blunt contradiction in terms: it is a cause whose eﬀect is … not
caused by it.
75 KV I, ii [I ⁄ 30 ⁄ 23-25| C 76] and KV I, iii [I ⁄ 35 ⁄ 25| C 80].
76 KV I, ii [I ⁄ 30 ⁄ 29-31| C 76]. The tension between God’s indivisibility and the exis-
tence of particular things in God seems to have occupied Spinoza throughout his
life. As I will later argue, the mature Spinoza solved this problem by relating par-
ticular things to God not as parts of a whole, but rather as modes of an indivisible
substance.
77 KV I, ii [I ⁄ 26 ⁄ 26| C 72] and [I ⁄ 30 ⁄ 25| C 76].
78 ‘‘E1p18: God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things. Dem.: Every-
thing that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God (by P15), and so (by
P16C1) God is the cause of [NS: all] things, which are in him. That is the ﬁrst
[thing to be proven]. And then outside God there can be no substance (by P14), i.e.
(by D3), thing which is in itself outside God. That was the second. God, therefore,
is the immanent, not the transitive cause of all things, q.e.d.’’
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3.8 Modes of Modes
Do Spinozistic modes, such as particular bodies and minds, themselves
have modes? In E3d3 Spinoza afﬁrms precisely the existence of such
entities:
By affect [aﬀectum] I understand the aﬀections of the body [corporis
aﬀectiones] by which the body’s power of acting is increased or dimin-
ished, aided or restrained.
Recall that Spinoza deﬁnes a mode as ‘‘the affections of substance [sub-
stantiae aﬀectiones].’’ Since the body itself is a mode of God, aﬀects
must be modes of a mode. The notion of a mode of a mode appears in
several other places in the Ethics.79 I doubt anyone would deny that
aﬀects such as joy, lust and anger are states that inhere in the body (or
in the mind). Hence, Curley has, I think, to concede that in some
places Spinoza is using ‘modes’ and ‘aﬀections’ in the traditional sense
of these terms. It is indeed possible that a writer uses a certain term in
more than one sense. We would like the writer to indicate when he or
she is using a term in an uncommon way, but writers are obviously not
perfect beings. Yet it is, I believe, fair to say that Spinoza is a relatively
careful writer. When he uses a term like ‘love’ in a sense diﬀerent from
his customary use he explicitly warns the reader.80 This, of course, does
not mean that Spinoza could not fail to warn the reader in other cases
of the equivocal use of a term. Yet we always approach a text assum-
ing that its terminology is not constantly changing (otherwise, any
attempt to understand a text would be hopeless), and it is, I think, a
clear deﬁciency of an interpretation when it forces the text to be read
as containing an equivocal use of crucial terminology.
3.9 Leibniz’s Report on His Conversations with Spinoza
Between the 18th and the 21st of November 1676, Leibniz visited Spi-
noza at the Hague. Before visiting Holland, Leibniz lived for a while in
Paris, where he met Baron Ehrenfried Walter von Tschirnhaus, one of
Spinoza’s most acute correspondents. We know that Tschirnhaus and
Leibniz discussed Spinoza’s views in detail.81 Leibniz was therefore
79 See, for example, E3p32s: ‘‘The images of things are the very aﬀections of the
human body, or modes by which the human body is aﬀected by external causes,
and disposed to do this or that.’’
80 When in E5p17c Spinoza claims that ‘‘strictly speaking, God loves no one,’’ he
arguably prepares his readers for a diﬀerent use of the term ‘love’ that would allow
God to love.
81 See Nadler, Spinoza—A Life, 1999, pp. 300-2, 341.
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probably well prepared for his meeting with Spinoza. Leibniz summa-
rizes his discussions with Spinoza as follows:
I saw [Spinoza] while passing through Holland, and I spoke with him
several times and at great length. He has a strange metaphysics, full of
paradoxes. Among other things, he believes that the world and God
are but a single substantial thing, that God is the substance of all
things, and that creatures are only modes or accidents [Il a une e´trange
Metaphysique, pleine de paradoxes. Entre autres il croit, que le monde
et Dieu n’est qu’une meˆme chose en substance, que Dieu est la sub-
stance de toutes choses, et que les creatures ne sont que des Modes ou
accidens.]. But I noticed that some of his purported demonstrations,
that he showed me, are not exactly right. It is not as easy as one thinks
to provide true demonstrations in metaphysics. [Emphasis mine.]82
As one can easily see, Leibniz understood Spinoza to be a pantheist
(‘‘the world and God are but a single substantial thing’’) and as taking
ﬁnite things to be God’s accidents. Furthermore, he considers this view
as ‘‘strange’’ and paradoxical. There is nothing strange or paradoxical
in the view that God is the cause of all things (as Curley interprets the
substance-mode relation). Could Leibniz have misunderstood Spinoza?
This is very unlikely given the fact that the two spoke ‘‘several times’’
and ‘‘at great length,’’ and that Leibniz was intrigued by Spinoza’s
view of God as the substance of all creatures. Curley’s interpretation of
the substance-mode relation is not particularly diﬃcult to grasp and it
should not take Spinoza much time to explain the issue. Could Spinoza
intentionally conceal his true understanding of the substance-mode
relation? No. Why should he? Why should (Curley’s) Spinoza conceal
his rather innocent and orthodox view of God’s relation to creatures
by making Leibniz believe that he embraces the strange and unortho-
dox view that all creatures are just accidents in God?
3.10 Modiﬁcations or Accidents
Letter 4, addressed to Henry Oldenburg, provides us with precious
information about the very early (1661) drafts of the Ethics.
[P]lease attend to my deﬁnitions of substance and accident ... :
(1) For by substance I understand that which is conceived through
itself and in itself, that is, that whose conception does not involve
the conception of another thing;
82 Translation by Nadler (Spinoza—A Life, 341). The original French can be found in
Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, I, p. 118.
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(2) and by modiﬁcation or accident I understand that which is in
something else and is conceived through that in which it is [per
modiﬁcationem autem, sive per Accidens id, quod in alio est, & per
id, in quo est, concipitur].
Hence, it is clearly established that,
(3) ﬁrst, that substance is prior in nature to its accidents; for without
it these can neither exist not be conceived.
(4) Secondly, beside substance and accidents nothing exists in
reality, or externally to the intellect.83
There is little doubt that (1)-(4) are the early formulations of E1a3,
E1a5, E1p1 and E1p4d, respectively, in the published version of the Eth-
ics. The main diﬀerence between the two texts is that in one place in
Letter 4 Spinoza identiﬁes modiﬁcations with accidents (see claim 2
above), and elsewhere uses ‘accidents’ instead of ‘modes’.84 Accidents
are commonly considered to both inhere in, and be predicated of, their
subject.85 Hence, Letter 4 seems to provide strong support for the claim
that Spinoza’s modes sive accidents are properties of the substance.86
Curley could of course respond by saying that the very fact that Spi-
noza abandoned the identiﬁcation of modes and accidents shows that
at least in the Ethics modes are not conceived as properties. Fortu-
nately, Spinoza does provide us with an explanation of why he
stopped using the terminology of ‘accidents’ (which appears quite
rarely in his late writings). The passage below is taken from the
Cogitata Metaphysica, the appendix to Spinoza’s 1663 book,
Descartes’ Principle of Philosophy.
I only wish it to be noted, concerning [the division of being], that we say
expressly that being is divided into Substance and Mode, and not into
Substance and Accident. For an Accident is nothing but a mode of
thinking [nam Accidens nihil est praeter modum cogitandi], inasmuch as
it denotes what is only a respect, E.g., when I say that the triangle is
moved, the motion is not a mode of the triangle, but of the body which is
moved. Hence the motion is called an accident with respect to the trian-
gle. But with respect to the body, it is called a real being. For the motion
83 Shirley 68 (IV ⁄ 13 ⁄ 30-14 ⁄ 6). The numeration of the claims is mine.
84 Similarly, one of Spinoza’s correspondents, Hugo Boxel, relates ‘accident’ and
‘mode’ as synonymous. See Ep. 55 (Shirley 274).
85 See Van Cleve, ‘‘Essence ⁄Accident’’ in A Companion to Metaphysics, 1995, p. 136.
86 Note that Leibniz also ascribes to Spinoza the view that creatures are ‘‘modes or
accidents’’ of God (see Leibniz’s report on his conversations with Spinoza, quoted
above).
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cannot be conceived without the body, though it can without the trian-
gle (I ⁄ 236 ⁄ 31-237 ⁄ 5| C 303). [Emphasis mine.]87
The passage is not easy to decipher, but it seems that Spinoza’s distinc-
tion between accident and mode is related to the dependence (or lack
thereof) of each upon its subject. While a mode cannot be conceived
independently of its substance, an accident can be so conceived.88 Since
movement can be conceived independently of the triangle, but not inde-
pendently of the body, movement is a mode of the body but only an
accident of the triangle.89 Whether we are satisﬁed by this explanation
or not, it is clear that in this passage Spinoza takes modes to be states
of the substance (‘‘the motion is a mode ... of the triangle which is
moved’’). The rejection of the terminology of ‘‘accident’’ seems to have
nothing to do with predication, since even after the rejection of the
synonymity of ‘mode’ and ‘accident,’ Spinoza understands mode as a
state of a thing and clearly not as an eﬀect.
3.11 Modes and Participles
Spinoza’s Compendium of the Hebrew Grammar was written at the end
of his life. Regrettably, this work has largely been neglected by Spinoza
scholars. I say regrettably, because between the lines of this text one
87 The example of the motion of the triangle follows Descartes’ Principles, I, 61 [CSM
I, 214]. However, unlike Descartes, Spinoza would deny that a ﬁgure is a mode of
a body. For Spinoza, geometrical ﬁgures are merely abstractions, or entia rationis.
See Letter 12 [IV ⁄ 57 ⁄ 7], and Letter 83 (‘‘... or in the case of mental constructs
[entia rationis] in which I include ﬁgures, but not in the case of real things’’).
88 See Gue´roult (Spinoza I, 65 n. 193) for a similar explanation of this distinction. Cf.
Des Chene, Physiologia, 1996, p. 132. The accidents Spinoza has in mind here are
presumably what were at the time otherwise called ‘real accidents,’ i.e., accidents
which are capable of existing independently of their substance.
89 According to Bayle the term ‘mode’ became widely used instead of ‘accident’ fol-
lowing the transubstantiation controversy. Oﬃcial Catholic doctrine holds that
after the consecration of the bread and wine in the Eucharist, the accidents of the
bread and wine remain, while their original substances turn into the blood and
body of Christ). Philosophers like ‘‘Descartes, Gassendi, and, in general, all those
who have abandoned Scholastic philosophy, have denied that an accident is separa-
ble from its subject in such a way that it could subsist after its separation’’ and
began employing the less common term ‘mode’ instead of ‘accident’ to make clear
that the qualities at stake are inseparable from their substance (Dictionary 331-2|
Dictionaire 224). For various Cartesian accounts of the transubstantiation, see Tad
Schmaltz, Radical Cartesianism, 2002, pp. 27-74. Bayle’s explanation is consistent
with Spinoza’s distinction between accident and mode in the Cogitata Metaphysica.
The Port-Royal Logic’s distinction between mode and accident is slightly diﬀerent.
Accidents are distinct ideas of modes which are joined with ‘‘the confused and
indeterminate idea of a substance’’ (Logic, 44). However, it is clear that for Nicole
and Arnauld both modes and accidents are predicated of and inhere in their sub-
stances.
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can easily ﬁnd some of Spinoza’s most crucial metaphysical doctrines.
One example is a certain analogy Spinoza draws between parts of
speech—noun (or substantive noun), adjective, participles, and the
metaphysical terms they denote—substance, attribute, modes.90 A frag-
ment of this analogy ﬁrst appears in the ﬁfth chapter of the work:
The noun Ish is a man [vir]; hacham [learned, doctus], gadol [big, mag-
nus], etc. are attributes of a man; holech [walking, ambulans], yodea
[knowing, sciens], are modes. (G I ⁄ 303 ⁄ 20| GLE 28).91
That ‘Ish’ [‘Man’] is a noun seems straightforward, but how does Spi-
noza distinguish between ‘gadol’ [‘big’] on the one hand, and ‘holech’
[‘walking’] on the other? What makes the ﬁrst (signify) an attribute,
and the second (signify) merely a mode? Spinoza answers these ques-
tions explicitly in the 33rd and last chapter of the work:
I call these participles since they signify a mode [modum signiﬁcant] by
which a thing is considered as in the present. But they [the participles]
themselves are frequently changed into pure adjectives which signify the
attributes of things; for example, ‘sofer’ is a participle, which means a
counting man [hominem numerantem], that is who is now occupied in
counting [qui jam in numerando est occupants], but most frequently it is
used as an attribute without any relationship to time, and signiﬁes a man
who has the job of counting [qui oﬃcium habet numerandi], namely a
scribe [scribam]...... So the passive participle ‘nivhar’ [chosen, electus],
that is a man or a thing which is now actually chosen [quae jam actu eligi-
tur]) is frequently attributed to a thing distinguished, namely of things
chosen above all; and in this manner intensive participles and others
change often in attributes, that is into adjectives which have no relation-
ship to time whatever (G I ⁄ 396 ⁄ 20| B 150, bold letters mine).
As the two quoted examples show, the distinction between adjectives and
participles is one of generality. While participles reﬂect temporally speci-
ﬁed properties (such as being chosen now), adjectives signify essential
properties which are not related to time (such as ‘‘being the chosen man,’’
or ‘‘the chosen people’’).92 The text leaves little room for doubt that Spi-
noza considers the distinction between modes and attributes (signiﬁed by
participles and adjectives, respectively) to be of the same kind: modes are,
90 I am indebted to Warren Zev Harvey for pointing out this crucial passage to me.
Harvey discusses this passage—though not in the context of Curley’s reading of
Spinoza—in his recent article, ‘‘Spinoza’s Metaphysical Hebraism,’’ 2002.
91 I have underlined the transliterated Hebrew words and put their Latin translations
in italics.
92 The attribute ⁄ adjective analogy appears also in the Short Treatise I, i (I ⁄ 18 ⁄ 32| C
64). For Spinoza’s discussion of whether the election of the Hebrews was a tempo-
ral or eternal matter, see TTP, Chapter 3 (Shirley 44).
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local, or temporally speciﬁed, properties, while attributes are essential
properties that have no relation to time. This seems to be as explicit as a
text can be in making the point that modes are local properties.
3.12 E1p4
In E1p4, Spinoza presents and proves his own formulation of the Iden-
tity of Indiscernibles.93 The proposition reads:
P4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another,
either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by a differ-
ence in their affections.
The individuation principle suggested by this proposition stipulates that,
(1) If x „ y, then there is some property (either essential or
accidental) which belongs to the one but not to the other.
The proof of the proposition is relatively simple.
E1p4d: Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by A1), i.e. (by D3 and
D5), outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their affec-
tions. Therefore, there is nothing outside the intellect through which a
number of things can be distinguished from one another except substances,
or what is the same (by D4), their attributes, and their affections, q.e.d.
This reading of E1p4 relies on an understanding of modes (‘affections’
and ‘things which are in another’ in this passage) as non-essential proper-
ties inhering in the substance. Obviously, Curley must read this proposi-
tion differently.94 For Curley, modes (‘aﬀections’) are eﬀects, and not
properties of the substance. What is ‘in itself’ is self-caused, and what is
‘in another’ is caused by another. Hence, according to Curley’s view, the
proposition should be read in the following manner:
E1p4 (according to Curley): Two or more distinct things are distin-
guished from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of
the substances or by a difference in their [effects].
Dem: Whatever is, is either [self-caused] or [caused by another] (by
A1), i.e. (by D3 and D5), outside the intellect there is nothing except
93 See Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, 1996, pp.
131-2.
94 In Behind the Geometrical Method, Curley discusses E1p4 extensively (pp. 12-15).
His discussion, however, concentrates on the relation between a substance and its
attributes, and does not provide an explanation for the clauses in E1p4 which deal
with modes. In the following, I consider an explanation of these clauses which I
believe Curley could suggest, given his interpretation of the deﬁnition of mode.
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substances and their [effects]. Therefore, there is nothing outside the
intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished from
one another except substances, or what is the same (by D4), their
attributes, and their [effects] q.e.d.
Clearly, Curley’s reading of the passage does not ascribe to it the state-
ment of the Identity of Indiscernibles, insofar as it allows for two
things to be distinguished by their effects (and not merely by their
internal properties). Yet, in itself, this does not seem to be a problem.
The problems arise when we look carefully at the principle which is sta-
ted in Curley’s version. The principle states that
(2) If x „ y, then either there is an attribute which belongs to
the one but not to the other, or there is an effect which
results from the one and not from the other.
There seems to be something awkward in a principle which treats attri-
butes as belonging to the same category as eﬀects insofar as they can be
individuated through either the one or the other. It would be far more nat-
ural to treat attributes and modes (in their traditional senses) as on par).
Still, perhaps (2) is stating an innovative and surprising principle of indi-
viduation?95 I do not think it does. One possibility which (2) neglects is
that two things could be individuated by their causes. If, as (2) states, two
things can be individuated by their eﬀects, why can they not be individu-
ated by their causes? This question gains more force once we pay attention
to Spinoza’s claim in E1a4 that the explanatory power of an eﬀect
depends on the explanatory power of its cause. But if things could be indi-
viduated only by their causes (i.e., if they could share precisely the same
internal properties and eﬀects), then clearly the proof of E1p4 is invalid.
3.13 Does Spinoza prove his Deﬁnition of Substance?
I mentioned earlier that Curley takes the ‘in se’ clause in the deﬁnition of
substance (E1d3) to mean causal self-suﬃciency. According to Curley, ‘‘a
substance is, by deﬁnition, something causally self-suﬃcient, and a mode is,
by deﬁnition, something causally dependent on something else, ultimately
on substance.’’96 Now, if causal self-suﬃciency were part of the deﬁnition
of substance (as Curley thinks), it would have been an odd methodological
practice on Spinoza’s part to have tried to prove the causal self-suﬃciency
of substance. If causal self-suﬃciency belongs to the deﬁnition of substance,
95 Cf. Leibniz’s discussion in De Summa Rerum of the similar idea that the principle of
individuation of a thing might be ‘‘outside the thing, in its cause’’ (A VI ⁄ 3, 491).
96 Curley, ‘‘On Bennett’s Interpretation,’’ 48 (Emphasis mine).
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then proving that this property belongs to substance is both redundant and
circular. Yet Spinoza leaves no doubt that he takes the causal self-suﬃ-
ciency of substance to be a demonstrable property. In E1p15s, Spinoza
states: ‘‘I have demonstrated clearly enough [Ego saltem satis clare`. demons-
travi]—in my judgment, at least—that no substance can be produced or
created by any other’’ (emphasis mine). Indeed, in E1p6, Spinoza states
and proves that one substance cannot be produced [non potest produci]
by another. Spinoza provides two detailed proofs for this proposition.
Dem.: In Nature there cannot be two substances of the same attribute
(by P5), that is, (by P2), which have something in common with each
other. Therefore (by P3) one cannot be the cause of the other, or can-
not be produced by another, q.e.d. ...
Alternatively: This is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity
of its contradictory. For if a substance could be produced by something
else, the knowledge of it would have to depend on the knowledge of its
cause (by A4). And so (by D3) it would not be a substance.
These two proofs would be completely redundant were Curley right.
What is the point in providing a proof for the characteristic by which
substance is deﬁned?97
Note further that the ﬁrst proof in E1p6d makes no reference to the
deﬁnition of substance (E1d3). The second proof does rely on the deﬁni-
tion of substance, yet even this proof relies only on the ‘per se concipitur’
clause, and not on the ‘in se’ clause of E1d3. The ‘per se concipitur’ clause,
together with E1a4, yield the absurdity of the contradictory of E1p6.
Now, if the ‘in se’ clause in E1d3 meant (as Curley claims) causal self-
suﬃciency, Spinoza’s practice in E1p6 would be very odd. He proves
what doesn’t need to be proven, and simply refuses to cite the clause
which (according to Curley) could prove his point immediately.98
97 In the Short Treatise Spinoza provides another detailed proof for the claim that
one substance cannot be produced by another. See KV I, ii (I ⁄ 20 ⁄ 34).
98 One last remark in this context. If (as the traditional interpretation of substance-
mode relation suggests) the deﬁnition of substance (E1d3) states that substance
does not inhere in something else and is not conceived through something else, then
Spinoza’s argumentative strategy in E1p6 makes good sense. Assuming that Spi-
noza’s primary audience is the Cartesians, it would make sense for Spinoza to
begin with a deﬁnition of substance acceptable to his audience, and then show that
certain surprising conclusions necessarily follow from it. As we saw earlier, the Car-
tesians have never deserted the predication deﬁnition of substance, and for Des-
cartes, the sine qua non condition for substantiality was the stipulation that
substance is the subject of predication. What Spinoza does in E1p6 is to show that
given certain assumptions, which he expects the Cartesians to share with him, he
can prove that substance must be causally self-suﬃcient. Had he already stipulated
the causal self-suﬃciency of substance in the deﬁnition, the Cartesians could most
easily defend their view by rejecting the suggested deﬁnition.
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I believe that the arguments I have discussed so far make a strong
case against Curley’s interpretation of the substance-mode relation.
What remains to be done is to answer the interesting objections raised
by Curley and Bayle. I turn to this task in the next section.
4. Replies to Bayle’s Arguments
4.1 Does God have Contradictory Properties?
The traditional formulation of the law of non-contradiction states that
two opposite terms cannot be afﬁrmed of the same subject at the same
time and in the same respect. Indeed, when Bayle argues that Spinoza’s
modes violate the law of non-contradiction, he includes the ‘‘same
respect’’ clause in the formulation of the law.99 Obviously, for Spinoza,
God does not love and hate honey in the same respect. While God qua
Napoleon loves it, God qua Josephine hates it. Spinoza developed this
respects-analysis into a genuine art. In numerous places he asserts that
a thing may have a certain property quatenus (insofar as) it is X, and a
diﬀerent (or even opposite) property quatenus it is Y. Thus, I can have
a causal relationship with a certain body, say a ﬂamingo, insofar as I
am an extended thing, but, insofar as I am a mind, I have no causal
relationship with any body (but only with ideas of bodies). It is simply
not in the same respect that I am, and I am not, causally related to
(the body of) the ﬂamingo.
This response might sufﬁce to discharge Bayle’s argument, as I,
following Curley, have presented it. But Bayle’s actual argument is
subtler. It relies heavily on Spinoza’s crucial claim that God is indi-
visible. Since God has no parts—says Bayle—every property of God
must belong to Him in His entirety, i.e., if Napoleon is a mode of
God, the entire God, and not only a part of God, must be Napo-
leon.100 Though one may, perhaps, elude this argument by again
using Spinoza’s diﬀerent respects analysis (i.e., by saying that in one
respect God is entirely Napoleon, and that in another respect, God
is entirely not Napoleon), I think we should not adopt this answer,
since Spinoza would never, I believe, agree to the claim that ‘‘God
is entirely Napoleon.’’101 In order to provide an adequate and
99 Bayle, Dictionary, 309 (remark N)| Dictionaire, V 212.
100 ‘‘This is the picture of the God of Spinoza; he has the power to change or modify
himself into earth, moon, sea, tree, and so on, and he is absolutely one and not
composed of any parts. It is then true that it can be asserted...that God entirely is
the earth, that God entirely is the moon’’ (Dictionary, 336 (remark DD)| Dictio-
naire, V 225).
101 Because this would amount to making Napoleon into an inﬁnite mode.
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complete answer to Bayle’s objection we will need to clarify the pre-
cise sense and scope of God’s indivisibility. This cannot be done
here,102 but let me just provide a rough outline of such an explana-
tion. Finite modes are just parts of certain inﬁnite totalities which
Spinoza calls ‘‘inﬁnite modes.’’ These inﬁnite modes, as opposed to
the substance and attributes, are divisible. Napoleon is neither a part
of God, nor is he God entirely. Napoleon (and any other ﬁnite
mode) is just a part of a property, an inﬁnite mode, which belongs
to God entirely. In the present case, Napoleon’s body is part of the
totality of bodies, which is an inﬁnite mode of Extension.103 It is this
inﬁnite mode of Extension which belongs to God entirely. Similarly,
Napoleon’s mind is part of the inﬁnite intellect, the totality of ideas
and the inﬁnite mode of Thought; the inﬁnite intellect is a property
which belongs to God entirely. The bottom line is that even if we
correct Curley’s presentation of Bayle’s argument, the argument still
seems easily dealt with through the divisibility of inﬁnite modes (of
which Bayle was apparently unaware).
4.2 Spinoza’s Radical Theodicy
The claim that Spinoza’s God is responsible for the most horrendous
evils insofar as He is the direct agent of these evils seems to me an
objection of much lesser weight. In fact, I would venture to say that
Spinoza could not care less about ascribing evil to God. For Spinoza
good and evil are merely mutilated human constructs.
Whatever seems immoral, dreadful, unjust, and dishonorable, arises
from the fact that [one] conceives the things themselves in a way
which is distorted, mutilated and confused (E4p73s).104
In the appendix to the ﬁrst part of the Ethics, Spinoza includes ‘good
and evil [Bonus et Malus 105]’ in the list of notions which are ‘‘entia, non
102 For a discussion of the indivisibility of natura naturans and the divisibility of natu-
ra naturata, see my yet unpublished paper on Inﬁnite Modes.
103 See Letter 64.
104 Cf. TTP Chapter 16 (S 180-1).
105 In a valuable editorial note, Curley remarks: ‘‘Malus can be translated by either
bad or evil. At one stage I preferred bad wherever possible, since evil has connota-
tions which seem inappropriate to Spinoza’s philosophy. I now think it is best to
retain the term and to regard Spinoza’s deﬁnition as deﬂationary. Like Nietz-
sche’s, Spinoza’s philosophy is, in some sense, beyond good and evil’’ (C 636).
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rationis, sed imaginationis.’’106 If men were born free, they would form
no concepts of good and evil (E4p68).107 Spinoza provides a fascinating
cognitive genealogy of evil that is based on his nominalism. We con-
ceive things as evil by comparing them with things we consider similar
and then judging how much better things could have been. When mak-
ing this comparison we rely on universals. For example, when we think
of Dostoevski’s Raskolnikov murdering his landlady, we compare him
with other men by using the universal ‘human being.’ We observe that
most particulars which fall under this universal are capable of mercy
and do not kill old ladies. Thus, we conclude that Raskolnikov’s act is
evil, insofar as it is less perfect (i.e., deprived of a perfection which nat-
urally belongs to it) than our notion of ‘human being’ (the universal
itself being merely an abstraction from the particulars we encounter).
In a similar way we conclude that the earthquake in Lisbon was evil,
since in other areas the Earth’s crust does not cause such devastation.
Now, for Spinoza all this is just illusionary thinking resulting from a
self-centered anthropomorphism. When we attribute to God the belief
that something is evil, we err even further in thinking that God, ‘‘just
like his creatures, [feels] sympathy with some things and antipathy to
others’’ (Letter 19| S 134. Emphasis mine). From the objective and true
perspective of God, there is no evil.108 God knows every entity in its
particularity, not through universals. ‘‘God does not know things in
abstraction, nor does he formulate general deﬁnitions of that sort’’
(Letter 19| IV ⁄91-92| S 134). There was no evil in the occurrence of the
106 E1app [II ⁄ 81 ⁄ 30, 82 ⁄ 17 and 83 ⁄ 15]. Similar claims appear in the Cogitata Meta-
physica II, vii (I ⁄ 262 ⁄ 2-21) (‘‘Good and Evil are nothing in Things, but only in
the human mind which compares things one with another’’), Letter 32 (S 192),
Letter 54 (S 269), and in the TTP Chapter 16 (S 180), Chapter 17 (Shirley 193).
On the Maimonidean background of Spinoza’s view, see Harvey, ‘‘A Portrait of
Spinoza as a Maimonidean,’’ 1981, pp. 158-60. Harvey rightly observes the inﬂu-
ence of Maimonides’ view, according to which ‘‘through the intellect one distin-
guishes between true and false [but] good and evil belong to the popularly
accepted notions’’ (Guide of the Perplexed, I, 2).
107 Cf. E4p64c: ‘‘if the human mind had only adequate knowledge, it would form no
notion of evil.’’
108 In contemporary scholarship there is a tendency to associate Spinoza’s view of
good and evil with Nietzsche’s relativist perspectivism. This comparison is valid,
but only to a certain point. Spinoza does treat good and evil as relative to the
individual (see E3p51d and Cogitata Metaphysica I, iv (I ⁄ 247 ⁄ 24)). As such, good
and evil are synonymous to the useful and harmful (E1app (81 ⁄ 35), E3p39s,
E4d1&2, E4p29d, and E4p30d). However, when things are considered from an
objective perspective—and for Spinoza, unlike Nietzsche, there is an objective per-
spective (i.e., the perspective of God, and of men, had they been born free
(E4p68) and had adequate knowledge (E4p64))—good or evil are just meaningless.
In this context, it is worth mentioning Spinoza’s claim in the TTP (Chapter 4.
Shirley 55-6) that describing God as ‘just’ is anthropomorphic.
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earthquake in Lisbon because this piece of land was not deprived of
any perfection with which God, or nature, could have endowed it. It
was as perfect as any other event on Earth. From the point of view of
Spinoza’s Christian contemporaries, Spinoza’s ‘‘solution’’ to the prob-
lem of evil may seem quite astonishing, even devastating, but this is a
direct result of one of the main lines of Spinoza’s thought: his battle
against anthropomorphism and the demand that the ‘‘proper order of
philosophizing’’ is to contemplate ﬁrst the divine nature, and only then
try to understand particular things from that perspective (E2p10s|
II ⁄93).109 From the divine and objective perspective, there is nothing
imperfect or evil.110
4.3 Spinoza’s Deﬂationary Account of God’s Immutability
On the face of it, the issue of divine immutability poses an unsolvable
dilemma for Spinoza: either God is a simple, immutable being, or he
has modes, and is thus changing. In his early period, Spinoza seems to
take this dilemma as a real one. Thus, he writes in the Cogitata Meta-
physica (1663):
That there is also in God no composition from diﬀerent modes is suﬃ-
ciently demonstrated from the fact that there are no modes in God.
For modes arise from the alteration of substance (Principles I, 56|.
Italics mine. I ⁄ 258 ⁄ 30| C 324).111
109 Cf. TTP, Chapter 2 (Shirley 22). Curley is in fact the most attentive contemporary
commentator on the importance of this line in Spinoza’s thought (see his ‘‘Man
and Nature in Spinoza,’’ 21, and ‘‘On Bennett’s Interpretation,’’ 40). Curley is also
the scholar who analyzed most beautifully Spinoza’s amoralism in his ‘‘Kissinger,
Spinoza, and Genghis Khan’’ and it is somewhat surprising that he assigns any
value to Bayle’s rather popular objection regarding ‘‘evil.’’
110 It is important to note that Spinoza’s ‘‘solution’’ to the problem of evil is far more
radical than Leibniz’s. One crucial issue where Spinoza’s view strongly conﬂicts
with Leibniz’s theodicy is in the question of local evil (another important point is
Leibniz’s aﬃrmation and Spinoza’s denial that ‘good’ can be truly ascribed to
God). Whereas for Leibniz limited segments of the world may appear evil (as long
as we disregard their contribution to the overall greatest good), Spinoza would
deny that even the slightest segment of the picture, even when taken in isolation,
is evil. On this issue I disagree with Carriero’s line of defense against Bayle’s argu-
ment, which contends that ‘‘since it is impossible to make local assessments of evil
and perfection, it is impossible to pin responsibility for local evil on God’’ (‘‘Mode
and Substance in Spinoza,’’ 272-3. Emphasis mine). Unlike this Leibnizian line of
defense, I do not think that the locality of evil is the issue here.
111 This passage may provide another argument against Curley’s interpretation of the
substance-mode relation. When Spinoza claims in this passage that God is not
composed ‘‘from diﬀerent modes’’ he clearly takes modes as inhering in the sub-
stance, and not as eﬀects. I have not discussed this passage among the other argu-
ments against Curley’s interpretation since it belongs to Spinoza’s early period
and the extent to which it represents Spinoza’s mature position is unclear.
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The reference at the end of this passage is to Descartes’ claim that
[W]e do not, strictly speaking, say that there are modes or qualities in
God, but simply attributes, since in the case of God, any variation is
unintelligible (Principles of Philosophy, I, 56| AT VIIIA, 26| CSM I,
211).
For both Descartes and the early Spinoza, God cannot have modes
insofar as modes are by-products of alterations in substance, whereas
God is immutable.112 The Spinoza of the Ethics clearly holds that there
are modes in God. I have argued that Spinoza conceives modes just
like Descartes, i.e., as non-essential properties inhering in their sub-
stance. Consequently, it would seem that God changes. But does not
the Spinoza of the Ethics openly deny any change in God? According
to Curley, Spinoza states this very claim in E1p20c2:113
God, or all of God’s attributes, are immutable [Deum, sive omnia Dei
attributa esse immutabilia].
Let’s look at this text carefully. Firstly, note that in E1p20c2 Spinoza
explicates God’s immutability with the claim that the attributes are
immutable. Why does Spinoza make this qualiﬁcation (and not state
simply that ‘God is immutable, period’)? Secondly, compare E1p20c2
with Spinoza’s treatment of the same topic in the Cogitata Metaphysica:
By change we understand here whatever variation there can be in a
subject while the very essence of the subject remains intact. (CM II,
iv| I ⁄ 255 ⁄ 25)
The last sentence begins a chapter whose title is ‘‘Of God’s Immuta-
bility.’’ In this chapter Spinoza proves that no change can occur in
God. Now, E1p20c2 and the passage from the Cogitata Metaphysica
seem to make very diﬀerent claims. Both passages claim that God is
immutable, but the two passages have opposite explications of what
God’s immutability is. E1p20c2 equates God’s immutability with no
change in God’s essence (i.e., the attributes). The CM passage
makes the far stronger claim that there is not even any non-essential
112 In his early (as well as later) period Spinoza seems to maintain the bi-conditional
‘x is immutable if and only if x is simple.’ Spinoza states the right-to-left side of
the bi-conditional in Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy, 1p18 (I ⁄ 178 ⁄ 3-7). The
passage I have just quoted from the Cogitata Metaphysica relies on God’s immuta-
bility in order to prove divine simplicity, viz. it states the left-to-right side of the
bi-conditional.
113 ‘‘It is clear that Spinoza will not allow that God can change (E1p20c2),’’ Behind
the Geometrical Method, 34.
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variation in God. Neither in E1p20c2, nor (as far as I know114) in
any other passage in the Ethics does Spinoza make the claim that
there is no non-essential variation in God. The question then arises,
why does Spinoza limit himself in the Ethics only to the weaker
explication of divine immutability? Finally, it seems that within the
Cartesian framework, in which Spinoza was working, E1p20c2
amounts to nothing over and above a trivial tautology. For Des-
cartes, all essential attributes are immutable.115 The essence (i.e., the
essential attributes) of the mouse is not less immutable than God’s;
why then make such a fuss about divine immutability which is
shared by any other thing having an essence?
My answer to these questions is that in the Ethics (unlike his
early period when he was just restating the Cartesian view that God
has no modes and is truly immutable) Spinoza accepts change and
movement in God. I am not aware of any late text which contradicts
this conclusion.116 What Spinoza was doing in E1p20c2 was just to
re-deﬁne divine immutability according to his own views, a practice
in which Spinoza is frequently engaged in the Ethics.117 Indeed, the
immutability of essential attributes is not something that is unique
to God. E1p20c2 provides a deﬂationary deﬁnition of divine
immutability.118
Finally, we may wish to consider Curley’s claim that ascribing
change to God goes against the dominant philosophical and theological
tradition in Western thought. We could argue whether there is such a
114 Spinoza employs ‘immutabilis’ in only two other places in the Ethics. In E1p21d,
he claims that ‘‘since Thought is supposed to be an attribute of God, it must exist
necessarily and be immutable’’ (II ⁄ 66 ⁄ 6). In the ﬁfth part of the Ethics, immuta-
bility plays a role in Spinoza’s account of blessedness, which ‘‘begets a Love
toward a thing immutable and eternal’’ (E5p20s| II ⁄ 294 ⁄ 12). In both cases it is
employed in relation to Natura naturans.
115 ‘‘We must take care here not to understand the word ‘attribute’ to mean simply
‘mode’, for we term an ‘attribute’ whatever we recognize as being naturally ascrib-
able to something, whether it be a mode which is susceptible of change, or the
absolutely immutable essence of the thing in question’’ Comments on a Certain
Broadsheet (AT VIIIB 348| CSM I 297). Emphasis mine.
116 Carriero arrives at a similar conclusion, though he considers the mutability of Spi-
noza’s God ‘‘an unavoidable cost’’ (‘‘Mode and Substance in Spinoza,’’ 266). I do
not think God’s mutability is an undesired outcome for Spinoza. Bennett’s ‘‘ﬁeld
metaphysics’’ also appears to endorse divine mutability.
117 Take, for example, Spinoza’s redeﬁnition of divine eternity in E1p19 (upon which
E1p20c2 relies): ‘‘Deus, sive omnia Dei attributa sunt aeterna.’’ Note the similarity
of the Latin sentences of E1p19 and E1p20c2. Arguably, for Spinoza, eternity as
well belongs to God only in some respects.
118 For a similar view according to which Spinoza’s modes are changing, non-identify-
ing characteristics, whereas attributes are identifying, immutable characteristics,
see Keith Campbell, Metaphysics, 1976, pp. 79-81.
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general agreement on the issue,119 but this would be beside the point.
Suppose there is such a consensus. Why cannot Spinoza still be innova-
tive on that issue? (Especially since we have plenty of evidence that he
was considered as non-conventional by his contemporaries, and that he
was well aware of this common perception of himself). In fact, the issue
of divine immutability seems to stand or fall together with that of
Spinoza’s pantheism. It is claimed (whether rightly or not) that the
mainstream of Western thought (if there is any such thing) rejects the
identiﬁcation of God with nature. I have argued that the textual evi-
dence shows categorically that Spinoza embraces pantheism. Even if
Spinoza’s pantheism places him against the mainstream, it should by
no means count as evidence against ascribing pantheism to him, since
we have plenty of testimonies which show that this is indeed how he
was considered, both by himself and his contemporaries. The same
applies to the issue of divine immutability.
5. ‘‘Wrong logical type,’’ Charitable Interpretation, and Spinoza on
Part and Whole
At the beginning of this paper we encountered Curley’s main argu-
ment: that to consider mountains, animals and other bodies as modes
(in the traditional sense of the term) is to commit a category mistake:
Spinoza’s modes are, prima facie, of the wrong logical type to be
related to substance in the same way Descartes’ modes are related to
the substance, for they are particular things (E1p25c), not qualities.120
With these claims, Curley was not criticizing Spinoza, but rather argu-
ing that Spinoza’s understanding of the substance-mode relation cannot
be identiﬁed with the common, Cartesian, understanding of this rela-
tion, since this would ascribe to Spinoza an extremely implausible view,
one that borders on nonsense. These claims clearly rely on a charity
principle. It is more charitable, one may argue, to interpret a speaker in
a way that will not assign to him or her a category mistake. In a well-
known example, Quine argues that were we to meet a speaker who
explicitly asserts a contradictory sentence, such as, ‘It is and it is not
raining now,’ we should ‘‘impose our logic upon [the speaker]’’ and
avoid ascribing to him the literal and illogical meaning of the sentence
119 In fact, it seems to me that religious thought less inﬂuenced by Greek philosophy
(which commonly associates change with imperfection) does assign change to
God. The common Talmudic and Rabbinic perception of God clearly takes God
as deliberating, responding, and even regretting his acts toward creatures, not to
mention the Christian belief that at some point in history God was incarnated.
120 Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 18
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(e.g., by taking it to mean ‘‘it’s just dripping’’).121 Though one may in
general question the justiﬁcation and usefulness of such a principle, my
aim here is much more modest. I want to show that the principle of
charity can be used only in a very limited and careful manner once we
are engaged in fundamental theoretical thinking (and that Curley’s
interpretation of the nature of Spinozistic modes fails to do just that).
Here are two illustrations of a questionable use of the principle.
The ﬁrst may appear straightforwardly absurd. In his Politics, Aris-
totle famously asserts that slavery is natural and that it is right and natu-
ral for some people to be slaves and for others to be masters.122 Now,
suppose a certain scholar argues that we should interpret the terms ‘slave’
and ‘master’ in senses diﬀerent from the usual ones (perhaps as designat-
ing an employee and an employer), since it is uncharitable to ascribe
support of slavery to a great moral philosopher such as Aristotle. This
scholar might add that perhaps his view does not ﬁt all the relevant Aris-
totelian texts, but given the attractiveness of Aristotle’s position under
the new interpretation, it is worth bending the texts in order to absolve
Aristotle from such an unreasonable position.123 One may respond to this
example by saying that the application of charitable interpretation in
moral discourse is much more prone to yield absurd results, and thus
cannot be compared with the use of the principle of charity in other
ﬁelds, such as logic or metaphysics. Well, consider the following example.
In The Concept of Mind (1949), Gilbert Ryle argued that Cartesian
dualism, which claims that both minds and bodies exist, commits a
category mistake by presupposing that there is a logical type under
which both minds and bodies fall and that existence can be univocally
ascribed to both kinds of things.124 Suppose that instead of criticizing
the Cartesian position he suggested that we should reinterpret Des-
cartes in a way that rids him of the alleged category mistake imbedded
in dualism. Here again one could argue that the revisionist interpreta-
tion may not ﬁt all the texts, but it might be worth bending some texts
121 Quine, Word and Object, 1960, p. 58.
122 Politics, 1255b7-10.
123 Unlike the case of slavery, which was embraced by most of Aristotle’s contempo-
raries, the view of particular things as properties inhering in God was not widely
embraced by Spinoza’s contemporaries. This dissimilarity does not seem to me to
wreck the analogy. The comparison, I think, is still valid since we have clear evi-
dence that Spinoza was considered by his contemporaries to have a very unusual
view of the relation of particular things to God. Hence, the historical context in
both cases (i.e., Aristotle’s view of slavery and Spinoza’s view of modes) supports
an interpretation of these philosophers as making claims that are inconsistent with
our so-called ‘‘common sense.’’
124 Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 1949, pp. 16-22.
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in order not to suppose that a great philosopher like Descartes commit-
ted a category mistake.
I believe that in both cases, as long as the more charitable interpreta-
tion contrasts with a signiﬁcant corpus of the author’s texts, it would not
be right to adopt such an interpretation only because it makes the
author’s view more attractive. Were we to accept these charitable inter-
pretations, we would not only be engaged in a historically anachronistic
practice, but most importantly we would miss the opportunity to chal-
lenge our own fundamental conceptions against those held by other intel-
ligent people of the past. This point is most crucial when we deal with
alleged category mistakes in texts dealing with foundational issues, since
quite a few philosophical and scientiﬁc breakthroughs resulted from cate-
gory mistakes (from the point of view of the old system). A Newtonian
or medieval physical theorist would most likely consider the concept of
time of the theory of relativity as such a mistake. Of course, this does not
mean that every category mistake leads to a theoretical breakthrough,
but only that we must be open to the possibility that what we see might
be a genuine and new way of understanding things.
When we do history of philosophy and encounter a claim that prima
facie seems to be a category mistake we should listen to Nietzsche’s old
advice that a philosopher must know how to ruminate thoughts. We
should ask ourselves questions such as: How central is the claim to the
wider system of that philosopher? To what extent was he aware of the
innovative nature of his claim? Is the said claim consistent with the rest
of his system? These questions will help us decide whether the claim is a
mere slip of pen, or one which adequately represents the considered view
of the philosopher. In the next stage, we should openly consider the plau-
sibility of the view against our own intuitions. If we ﬁnd that the alleged
category mistake is well supported by the texts of the relevant writer and
we remain convinced of the nonsensical nature of the claim, we should
simply conclude that the writer ⁄philosopher was wrong.
When we apply these methodological suggestions to the case of
Spinoza’s conception of the substance-mode relation, we ﬁnd that
the text is hardly reconcilable with Curley’s reading (or at least
that’s what I have been trying to show so far). If so, we can either
reject Spinoza’s position (that particular things, like mountains, are
modes) as a category mistake, or reconsider our own views.
In the rest of this section, I will try to help make intelligible Spi-
noza’s claim that things, such as Mt. Rushmore, are modes inhering in
God (the issue of predication will be discussed in the following section).
I will do this in two ways. First, I will argue that though Spinoza’s
metaphysics was deﬁnitely innovative to his contemporaries, the speciﬁc
claim that things can be considered as modes of other things was not
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anathema in the seventeenth century. Second, I will suggest an explana-
tion as to what brought Spinoza to view particular things as modes of
God, and how this claim is related to pantheism and to God’s indivisi-
bility. Yet, before I turn to these tasks, let me brieﬂy add one more
point regarding charitable interpretation.
One could, and I think should, argue that considerations of charity
work against Curley’s position. If, as Curley suggests, Spinoza takes
modes to be just eﬀects of the substance, then (as I have already
mentioned) Spinoza turns out to be much closer to good old theism.125
For many, this may seem to disappointingly ﬂatten Spinoza’s far more
bold and interesting position.126 The price we pay for making Spinoza like
us is that it is no longer clear why we should have an interest in Spinoza
(we have plenty of ourselves even without Spinoza, and we have plenty of
other theists in the seventeenth century).
I turn now to examine Spinoza’s view of the substance-mode rela-
tion in the context of his contemporaries. Arguably, it is not at all clear
that to consider things as modes is indeed such an uncommon view
that it is not to be found among Spinoza’s contemporaries. Clearly
many philosophers adhered to the view that a mental thing can inhere
in another thing (either mental or physical).127 This is most evident
when we consider views which take the mind to be a simple. In such a
case whatever is in the mind cannot be part of the mind, and hence
one natural way of explaining mental change and the internal working
of the mind is by taking intra-mental items as qualities or modes of the
mind (rather than parts). An example of such a view is Leibniz’s claim
that the perceptions in the monads are the aﬀections (or as Ariew and
Garber translate it, ‘‘properties’’) of these monads.128 But even when
125 Or, as Curley puts it, a ‘‘good Cartesian’’ (Behind the Geometrical Method, 12).
Obviously, some theists may not like the conception of God as a law of nature.
126 See Carriero, ‘‘Mode and Substance in Spinoza,’’ 254.
127 In his unpublished paper ‘‘Predication and Pantheism in Spinoza,’’ Della Rocca
rightly points out that to view modes as inhering in the substance is hardly prob-
lematic as long as we deal with the attribute of thought (i.e., the relation of modes
of Thought to the thinking substance). In other words, Curley’s problem seems to
be not so much about how Spinozistic modes (in general) can inhere in, and be
predicated of, the substance, but rather how bodies can inhere in, and be predi-
cated of, anything.
128 See Monadology, sections 13 (‘‘there must be a plurality of properties [aﬀections]
and relations in the simple substance, although it has no parts’’) and 17 (‘‘...this is
all one can ﬁnd in the simple substance—that is, perceptions and their changes’’)
(Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, pp. 214-5). It is possible that Leibniz’s use of ‘aﬀec-
tion’ follows Spinoza’s deﬁnition of mode (E1d5). For another example, see Des-
cartes’ suggestion in the Second Meditation that the faculties of imagination and
sense perception are modes inhering in the thinking substance (AT VII 78| CSM
II 54).
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we deal with physical things, it is not clear that one physical thing can-
not be considered a mode of another thing. In his correspondence with
Arnauld, Leibniz suggests that beings through aggregation [entia per
aggregationem], i.e., bodies, are only states or modes of the substances
which constitute them.129
Even more telling are the following two passages from Arnauld and
Nicole’s Logic. The ﬁrst passage presents a three-fold distinction
between kinds of modes, of which the ﬁrst are substantial modes:
We should note further that some modes can be called substantial
[substanciels] because they represent true substances applied to other
substances as modes and manners [parcequ’ils nous repre´sentent de
veritables substances applique´es a` d’autres substances, comme des
modes & des manieres]. Being clothed and being armed are modes
of this sort other modes can be called simply real. These are true
modes which are not substances but manners of a substance.
Finally, some can be called negative because they represent the sub-
stance with a negation of some real or substantial modes (Logic or
the Art of Thinking, Part 1, Chapter 2).
[W]hen two substances are considered together, one can be viewed as
a mode of the other [quand on considere deux substances ensembles, on
peut en considerer une comme mode de l’autre]. Thus a clothed person
could be considered as a whole composed of the person and the cloth-
ing. But with respect to the person, being clothed is only a mode or a
manner of being under which one is considered, although the clothes
are substances (Part 1, Chapter 7).
In the background of these two passages are similar—though signiﬁ-
cantly different—claims of Descartes in the Sixth Set of Replies:
I do admit that one substance can be attributed to another sub-
stance; yet when this happens it is not the substance itself which has
the form of an accident, but only the mode of attribution. Thus
when clothing is the attribute of a man, it is not the clothing itself
which is the accident, but merely ‘being clothed’’ (AT VIII 435|
CSM II 293).
For Descartes, the claim ‘clothing is a mode or accident of person
x’ is merely a loose formulation of the claim ‘x’s being clothed.’
This does not seem to be the case with Arnauld and Nicole’s discus-
sion of the issue. Unlike Descartes, they do not deny that, in some
129 ‘‘What constitutes the essence of a being through aggregation is only a state of
being of its constituent beings’’ (The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, 121). See
Donald Rutherford, ‘‘Leibniz’s Analysis of Multitude and Phenomena into Unities
and Reality,’’ 1990, p. 531.
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respects, (‘‘… could be considered’’) the clothes (and not just ‘being
clothed’) are modes of the person. They seem to acknowledge the
existence of a genuine class of ‘substantial modes,’ i.e., modes that
‘‘represent true substances applied to other substances as modes and
manners.’’130
Finally, we should consider Descartes’ claim in the Synopsis to the
Meditations that only ‘‘body, taken in the general sense, is a substance,
so that it never perishes.’’ Unlike this ‘‘body in the general sense,’’ the
human body (and other particular bodies) is just ‘‘made up of certain
conﬁgurations of limbs and other accidents of that sort [non nisi ex
certaˆ membrorum conﬁguratione aliique ejusmodi accidentibus constare]’’
(AT VII 14| CSM II 10). The passage takes the whole physical realm
as one indestructible substance,131 and it can be read as considering
particular bodies and their parts as accidents of the one extended sub-
stance. While some scholars deny that in this passage Descartes consid-
ers ﬁnite bodies to be modes or accidents,132 Curley, with impressive
candor, takes the passage to make this very proto-Spinozistic claim.
Curley is clearly bothered by this precedent,133 yet he points out that in
many other texts Descartes refers to particular bodies as independent
130 Whether one substance can be a mode of another substance is a function of one’s
deﬁnition of substance. As we have seen above (§2), Arnauld and Nicole deﬁne
substance as identical with ‘‘thing.’’ Substance is said to be ‘‘conceived as subsist-
ing by itself,’’ but this does not rule out the possibility of that substance being a
mode of another on certain occasions (Logic or the Art of Thinking, Part I, Chap-
ter ii.). In the Short Treatise, Spinoza himself suggests that the thinking substance
and extended substance are modes of God (i.e., that substances can be considered
as modes of another substance). In the ﬁrst dialogue of the book, Reason [Reede]
the interlocutor that usually presents the author’s views, claims: ‘‘And if you want
to call the corporeal and the intellectual substances in respect to the modes which
depend on them, you must equally call them modes too, in relation to the sub-
stance on which they depend. For you do not conceive them as existing through
themselves. In the same way that you call willing, sensing, understanding, loving,
etc., diﬀerent modes of what you call a thinking substance (all of which you lead
back to one, making one of them all), so I also infer, by your own proof, that inﬁ-
nite extension and thought, together with other inﬁnite attributes (or as you would
say, substances) are nothing but modes of that unique, eternal, inﬁnite Being,
existing through itself’’ (I ⁄ 29 ⁄ 24-34). I do not place much weight on this passage,
since it is clear that in his mature period Spinoza did not maintain this position.
The deﬁnition of substance in the Ethics clearly cannot tolerate one substance
being dependent on another substance. Note, however, that this is a change in the
criteria for substantiality (not of thinghood); we have no indication that in his
mature period a thing [res] could not be a mode of a substance.
131 Cf. Gue´roult, Spinoza I, 63.
132 See Woolhouse, The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics,
p. 53, n. 36.
133 Curley refers to this passage in virtually all of his discussions of the substance-
mode relation. See ‘‘On Bennett’s Interpretation,’’ 50 n. 10, Behind the Geometrical
Method, 32-3, 142 n. 9, The Collected Works of Spinoza, 646.
YITZHAK Y. MELAMED 61
substances, not modes, and hence suggests that the Synopsis passage
(and a similar text in the Principles134) does not represent Descartes’
considered view. While I tend to agree with Curley as to Descartes’
considered view, I still think that the very fact that Descartes seriously
weighed this Spinozistic path shows that it was not a senseless category
mistake.
I return to Spinoza. Having encountered passages of this sort,135
Spinoza could have been triggered to pursue this intriguing line,
especially if it could solve one of the major problems he was facing
in the development of his system. In the following I will suggest an
outline of the reasoning which could have motivated Spinoza to view
particular things as modes. The way I present this outline is close,
but not identical, to Spinoza’s actual argumentation in the Ethics. In
a sense, I will try to explain what motivated Spinoza to deﬁne sub-
stance and modes in the way he did. We will consider Spinoza’s
arguments in two stages.
First Stage: From God’s Absolute Inﬁnity to Pantheism. We begin
with the deﬁnition of God (E1d6)—perhaps the most important pas-
sage in the book—as a ‘‘being absolutely inﬁnite, that is, a substance
consisting of an inﬁnity of attributes, of which each one expresses an
eternal and inﬁnite essence.’’ For Spinoza, inﬁnity entails unlimited-
ness (See E1d2 and E1d6e). For God to be absolutely unlimited, he
must be everywhere, i.e., he must have the attribute of extension,
and cannot be external to—or limited by—anything extended.136 In
other words, the mere absolute inﬁnity of God directs Spinoza
134 Descartes, Principles, II, i, 23. Cf. Curley, Behind the Geometrical Order, 142 n. 9.
135 Obviously, Spinoza was well acquainted with Descartes’ works. Spinoza’s relation
to the Port-Royal Logic is an intriguing issue which has hardly been studied. The
ﬁrst three editions of the Logic appeared during Spinoza’s lifetime (the ﬁrst in
1662), and were immediately inﬂuential. The list of Spinoza’s personal library
includes a copy of the Logic in the original French. Yet, as far as I know, Spinoza
did not know French. The story is even more interesting since the Logic seems to
be the only French book in Spinoza’s library (in fact, the only item in a language
Spinoza did not know). I suspect that Spinoza became interested in the book from
what he heard from his friends, and that in studying it he relied on his extensive
knowledge of other Romance languages. He could also have relied on friends for
translation and study of the book.
136 According to E1p6e, God is absolutely inﬁnite while the attributes are only inﬁnite
in their own kind. The latter inﬁnity is constituted by the fact that it is possible
‘‘to deny inﬁnite attributes’’ (i.e., all the other attributes) of each attribute. Of
God’s absolute inﬁnity it is impossible to deny any attribute. Hence, no thing
under any attribute can limit God. Cf. Letter 36, where Spinoza replaces his usual
distinction between the absolute inﬁnity of God and the inﬁnity in their own kind
of the attributes by the claim that God is absolutely indeterminate while the attri-
butes are indeterminate in their own kind.
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toward pantheism.137 If, as Curley suggested, God were identical with
Natura naturans, but not with Natura naturata, God would be limited
by Natura naturata, and hence, not be inﬁnite.138
Second Stage: From the Priority of God to the Rejection of Whole-Part
Pantheism. If God is identical with nature, or with existence in general,139
there arises the question of how ﬁnite things are related to God. One nat-
ural path is to consider particular things as parts of God. I will call this
view ‘Whole-Part Pantheism.’ However, Spinoza cannot embrace whole-
part pantheism for the following reasons. Spinoza’s understanding of the
part-whole relation is quite traditional. Parts are prior to their whole,
both in nature and in our knowledge.140 In E1p12d, Spinoza states that it
would be absurd to think that ‘‘the whole could both be and be conceived
without its parts.’’ Similarly, in Letter 35 Spinoza argues that the being
which includes necessary existence (i.e., God) ‘‘is simple and not com-
posed of parts. For in respect of their nature and our knowledge of them
component parts would have to be prior to that which they compose’’ (S
203, emphasis mine).141 Given the ontological and epistemological priori-
ties Spinoza assigns to parts, he would have to hold that parts of God,
such as ﬁnite things, are prior to God (both in nature and in knowledge),
137 Here one may object that many other philosophers ascribe inﬁnity to God without
thereby endorsing pantheism. Spinoza’s view, however, is diﬀerent. For Spinoza,
God’s absolute inﬁnity entails that he must have all the attributes (including
Extension), and that in each attribute, God must be inﬁnite in its kind, i.e., com-
pletely unlimited. Perhaps one could still argue that limitation should not be con-
strued as mutual exclusion. The Cartesian God is not identical to other thinking
substances, but Descartes would clearly try to reject the conclusion that God is
limited by other thinking substances. Descartes might suggest that x is limited by
y if and only if x „ y and x is caused by y. It is obvious, however, that Spinoza
deﬁnes limitation in terms of mutual exclusion (see E1d2), and that limitation can-
not be deﬁned through causal relations. The attributes are causally independent of
each other, yet in Letter 36 Spinoza strongly hints that the attributes limit each
other (in this letter God is taken as absolutely unlimited, while Thought and
Extension are merely unlimited in their kinds. Presumably the reason why Thought
and Extension are not absolutely unlimited is because they limit each other).
138 Spinoza does not use this short argument for pantheism when he proves that all
things are in God (E1p15). Presumably, this is because E1p15 attempts to prove
not only pantheism, but also that all things are modes of God.
139 I avoid deﬁning pantheism as the claim that God is identical with the totality of
things (or the totality of existing things), since the notion of totality may imply
accumulation or aggregation, while God (qua Natura naturans) is indivisible.
140 For some twentieth century endorsements of the priority of parts over their
wholes, see G.E. Moore, Philosophical Studies, 1922, pp. 287-8, and McTaggart,
Some Dogmas of Religion, 1906, p. 108. Cf. Chisholm, ‘‘Parts as essential to their
Wholes,’’ 1973, pp. 582-3.
141 In the early Cogitata Metaphysica I, v (I ⁄ 258 ⁄ 15| C 324), Spinoza makes the
slightly more moderate claim that ‘‘component parts are prior in nature at least to
the thing composed.’’
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were he to embrace whole-part pantheism. The latter, however, would
bluntly conﬂict with one of the deepest and most important tenets of his
philosophy—the strict priority of the inﬁnite over the ﬁnite. A clear state-
ment of this tenet appears in E2p10s2, where Spinoza harshly criticizes
his philosophical predecessors who
did not observe the [proper] order of philosophizing. For they believed
that the divine nature, which they should have contemplated before
all else (because it is prior both in knowledge and in nature) is last in
the order of knowledge, and that the things which are called objects
of the senses are prior to all. (E2p10s2, emphasis mine)
Obviously, if God is prior (both in knowledge and in nature) to ﬁnite
things, and parts are prior (both in knowledge and in nature) to their
whole, then ﬁnite things cannot be parts of God. But if God is everything
that is, then ﬁnite things cannot be external to God either. What then can
they be?142
Well, let’s see. Finite things are in God, but they are not parts of
God (since God is indivisible). The relation Rxy (def=x is in y, but
not as part of y) has a clear precedent in the history of philosophy.143
This is precisely how Aristotle deﬁnes ‘being in a subject,’ the relation
which holds between an accident and the subject in which it inheres.
By ‘in a subject’, I mean what is in something, not as a part, and can-
not exist separately from what it is in. (Categories 1a20)
Accidents, but not substances, are in something else.144 A traditional
example in this context is the relation of knowledge-of-grammar to the
soul; it is in the soul, but not part of the soul. Earlier in this paper we
142 One interesting answer that I consider in another place (The Metaphysics of Sub-
stance and the Metaphysics of Thought, 83-95) is that for Spinoza ﬁnite things are
illusions. This is the so-called ‘acosmist’ reading of Spinoza that was common
among the German Idealists and some late nineteenth-century British scholars.
Though this line of interpretation has, I believe, some support in Spinoza’s
thought, it conﬂicts with too many important doctrines of Spinoza’s and as a
result should be ultimately rejected.
143 For the distinction between ‘being part of x’ and ‘being a mode x,’ see Descartes’
claim in the Sixth Set of Replies that ‘‘a mode cannot be part of a substance’’
(CSM II 292| AT VII 433). Although the stipulation that the mode is not part of
the substance does not appear explicitly in some seventeenth century deﬁnitions of
the term, it is implicitly stated by the standard stipulation that modes cannot be
or be conceived without their substance (in conjunction with the common view
that parts are conceived prior to their whole). See, for example, the Port Royal
stipulation that a mode is ‘‘not able to subsist without [its substance]’’ (Logic, or
the Art of Thinking, First part, Chapter 2, p. 30). Cf. Descartes’ Principles of Phi-
losophy I 64 (AT VIIIA31| CSM I 216).
144 See 3.10. above
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have seen that in the early modern period many philosophers started
using ‘mode’ instead of ‘accident’ to make clear that the entity at stake
cannot exist independently from its subject.145 Given this state of
aﬀairs, the substance-mode relation was the perfect solution to the
problem of relating particular things to Spinoza’s absolutely inﬁnite
and indivisible God ⁄Nature. Particular things are in God, but are not
parts of God. They are modes of God.
Indeed, Bayle, who was one of Spinoza’s most careful readers,
observes this point very clearly:
[Spinoza] taught not that two trees were two parts of extension, but
two modiﬁcations...One of the principle pillars [of Spinoza’s system]
was the alleged difference between the word ‘part’ and the word ‘mod-
iﬁcation.’146
6. Modes, Tropes, and other Things (or Properties)
I have argued that Spinoza’s pantheism and his defense of the indivisi-
bility of God could explain his motivation to view particular things
(such as Mt. Rushmore) as being in God in the way a mode inheres in
a substance. In other words, though the common view of Spinoza as a
pantheist is correct, it is important to make clear that Spinoza main-
tains a Substance-Mode Pantheism and not a Whole-Part Pantheism.
At this point we should consider one further question. Are Spinozis-
tic modes predicated of—or are they properties of 147—God? I have so
far argued that for Spinoza modes inhere in God. Cartesian modes are
also predicated of their substance. Yet some scholars have interestingly
suggested that Spinoza divorces inherence (and being a property) from
145 See 3.10 above.
146 Dictionary, 306 (remark N)| Dictionaire, V 211.
147 In the following I will treat ‘being predicated of x’ and ‘being a property of x’ as
roughly the same. Properties are commonly taken as metaphysical entities. Predi-
cates are taken to be linguistic expressions, though occasionally also the entities
designated by the expressions. Whether predicates designate properties or other
entities (such as sets, or relations between objects in possible worlds) is a contro-
versial issue. Ramsey has pointed out that the same content can be expressed by
sentences which switch the roles of subject and predicate (as in ‘‘Socrates is wise’’
and ‘‘Wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates.’’ See Ramsey, ‘‘Universals,’’ 1997,
p. 60). All this should not concern us here, since it is clear that Curley’s query
does not deal with the expression ‘Mt. Rushmore’ but rather with the question of
whether it is a category mistake to take a body such as this mountain as a prop-
erty of God. We will see that in E3p55c2d, Spinoza takes powers to be predicated
of the subject (body or mind) to which they belong, i.e., he uses predication in the
metaphysical, rather than linguistic, sense. Finally, I am in agreement with
Garrett’s note that describing the relation of modes to substance as ‘‘adjectival’’ is
too linguistic ‘‘to match Spinoza’s primary metaphysical concerns’’ (‘‘Spinoza’s
Conatus Argument,’’ p. 156, n. 16).
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predication, and hence that Curley’s query about the mystery of ‘‘how
one thing is predicated of another’’148 is ill-targeted since Spinoza takes
particular things to inhere in (and be properties of) the substance, but
not to be predicated of the substance.149
In the following I will argue for the stronger claim that for Spinoza
modes not only inhere in God but are also properties predicated of
God. First, I will present textual evidence in Spinoza’s writings that
support my claim. Second, I will argue that there is no category mis-
take involved in the claim that Mt. Rushmore is a property of God.
Curley’s assumption of a clear dichotomy between things and proper-
ties was neither generally accepted by Spinoza’s contemporaries nor is
it unchallenged in current metaphysics.
I turn ﬁrst to the text. A crucial piece of evidence is E1p16:
P16: From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow inﬁ-
nitely many things in inﬁnitely many modes (i.e., everything which
can fall under an inﬁnite intellect.) [Ex necessitate divinae naturae inﬁ-
nita inﬁnitis modis (hoc est, omnia, quae sub intellectum inﬁnitum
cadere possunt) sequi debent].150
Dem.: This Proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends
to the fact that the intellect infers from the given deﬁnition of any
thing a number of properties [plures proprietates] that really do follow
necessarily from it (i.e., from the very essence of the thing); and that
it infers more properties the more the deﬁnition of the thing expresses
reality, i.e., the more reality the essence of the deﬁned thing
involves .... (Emphasis mine)
The key questions for our inquiry concern the character of the properties
which, according to the demonstration, the intellect infers from the deﬁni-
tion of any thing, and how this inference relates to the ﬂow of the inﬁ-
nitely many things in inﬁnitely many ways from God’s essence. But
before we approach these questions let me begin with a short clariﬁcation
of the proposition itself. Some readers of this proposition tend to see it as
claiming that the inﬁnita inﬁnitis modis which follow from the necessity of
God’s nature are the inﬁnite attributes (each of which has inﬁnitely many
148 Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 18.
149 ‘‘I conclude that the objection that ... modes are of the ‘wrong logical type’ to be
particulars rests on an assimilation of inherence with predication and a closely
related dismissal of the notion of an individual accident ...’’ (Carriero, ‘‘Mode and
Substance in Spinoza,’’ 256-9). Similarly, see Jarrett, ‘‘Substance and Mode in Spi-
noza,’’ 85. Carriero and Jarrett are presumably hesitant to call the relation of
non-universal properties to their subject ‘predication.’ See note 8 above. The issue
of individual accidents (tropes) will be discussed later in this section.
150 Cf. Ep. 43 (IV ⁄ 223 ⁄ 6), where Spinoza suggests that the modes emanate [emanare]
from God’s nature.
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modes).151 This does not seem to be the case. According to E1p29s, what
‘‘follows from the necessity of God’s nature’’ is Natura naturata (i.e., the
modes), while the substance and attributes are Natura naturans (i.e.,
God’s essence). The attributes do not follow from God’s nature or
essence; they are God’s nature. Hence, E1p16 must be read as dealing
with the inﬁnite inﬁnity of modes that follow from God’s essence (since
only modes follow from God’s essence or nature).
I turn now to the question of the ‘properties’ that follow ‘‘from the
given deﬁnition of any thing’’ in E1p16d. In order to understand the
demonstration we must ﬁrst clarify Spinoza’s criteria for the correct-
ness of a deﬁnition. A detailed discussion of the issue appears in the
Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Here Spinoza stipulates:
To be called perfect, a deﬁnition will have to explain the inmost
essence of the thing [intimam essentiam rei], and to take care not to
use certain propria [propria] in its place (TdIE § 95| II ⁄ 34 ⁄ 29-31).
Indeed, in several places Spinoza stresses that a precise deﬁnition must
specify only the essence of the thing deﬁned,152 so much so that in some
places he takes ‘essence,’ ‘nature’ and ‘deﬁnition’ of a thing to be inter-
changeable.153 But what are the propria which Spinoza warns us not to
confuse with the essence of the thing? Here, Spinoza follows a common
Scholastic (and ultimately Aristotelian) threefold distinction between
qualities which make the thing what it is (these are the qualities which
constitute the essence of the thing), qualities which necessarily follow
from the essence of the thing, but do not constitute the essence itself
(these are the propria), and qualities which are at least partly caused by
a source external to the thing, and which are termed ‘accidents’ (or
‘extraneous accidents’).154 Though a thing has necessarily both its
essence and its propria,155 it is only the former that provides us with an
explanation of the nature of the thing, and hence should be included in
151 Note that the Latin does not mention ‘things.’
152 See Ep. 8 (IV ⁄ 42 ⁄ 30), Ep. 34 (Shirley 201).
153 See, for example, Ep. 12 (IV ⁄ 53 ⁄ 3-5).
154 ‘Extraneous accident’ is the term used by Aquinas to designate these qualities (see
Carriero, ‘‘Spinoza’s view on Necessity,’’ 1991, p. 69). Garrett simply uses ‘acci-
dents’ instead (see his ‘‘Spinoza’s Necessitarianism,’’ 1991, p. 201).
155 In fact, even some accidents are inseparable from their substratum, despite the fact
that these accidents do not follow from the thing’s essence. A common example of
such accidents is the blackness of the crow (see Porphyry, Isagoge, 12-13). However,
in the case of inseparable accidents, the substratum can be conceived without the
accidents (Isagoge, ibid.). Another important diﬀerence between propria and insepa-
rable accidents is that accidents, but not propria, admit of more or less of the acci-
dent (i.e., a crow can be more black or less black, but risibility (like rationality) is
shared equally by all particulars who have it. See Isagoge, 9 ⁄ 18 and 22 ⁄ 10).
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the deﬁnition. Spinoza explains that the reason why it is important that
the deﬁnition should capture the essence of the thing rather than its
propria is ‘‘because the properties of things [proprietates rerum] are not
understood so long as their essences are not known’’ (TdIE §95|
II ⁄35 ⁄6-7).156 Notice that in this passage the word ‘proprietates’ has the
technical sense of propria rather then property in general. In fact, in his
discussion of deﬁnition in sections 95-97 of the TdIE, Spinoza explicitly
uses the term ‘propria’ only once (II ⁄34 ⁄30). In all other cases (35 ⁄4,
35 ⁄6, 35 ⁄18, and 36 ⁄1) he uses ‘proprietates’ (properties), but in the
narrow sense of propria, rather than properties in general.
Following the stipulation that a perfect deﬁnition should explain the
essence and not the propria of the thing deﬁned, Spinoza provides an
example of the distinction between essence and propria.157 He proceeds to
distinguish the requirements for the perfect deﬁnition of a created thing
from the requirements for the perfect deﬁnition of an uncreated thing. In
both cases, however, Spinoza stipulates that ‘‘all the thing’s properties’’
[omnes proprietates rei] must be inferred [concludantur] from the deﬁni-
tion, insofar as the deﬁnition states the essence.158
Let us return now to E1p16 and its demonstration. Since the deﬁ-
nition of a thing states the essence or nature of a thing, it is clear
that what follows from God’s essence in E1p16 is what the intellect
infers [concludit] from the deﬁnition of God in E1p16d. The ‘proper-
ties’ in E1p16d cannot be God’s attributes, since the latter constitute
God’s essence rather than follow from it. What follows from God’s
essence, or what the intellect infers from the deﬁnition of God are
only the entities belonging to Natura naturata, i.e. the modes, which
in E1p16d Spinoza explicitly terms ‘properties’ [proprietates]. Proper-
ties that follow necessarily from the essence of a thing must be
understood in the technical sense of propria.159 Indeed, modes stand
in the same relation to God’s essence as the propria of a thing
related to the thing’s essence. They cannot be understood without
God’s essence (E1d5), and according to E1p16, all modes follow (or
156 See Short Treatise, I iii, note a (I ⁄ 34 ⁄ 30), for a similar point regarding God’s
propria.
157 ‘‘If a circle, for example, is deﬁned as a ﬁgure in which the lines drawn from the
center to the circumference are equal, no one fails to see that such a deﬁnition
does not at all explain the essence of the circle, but only a property [proprietatem]
of it’’ (TdIE § 95| II ⁄ 35 ⁄ 1-3). For a discussion of Descartes’ view of the relation
between substance and its propria, see Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics,
68-9.
158 TdIE § 96 (II ⁄ 35 ⁄ 19), and § 97 (II ⁄ 36 ⁄ 1).
159 In other words, non-propria qualities (such as accidents) do not follow from a
thing’s essence.
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can be deduced) from God’s essence. In other words, Spinoza’s
modes are God’s propria.160
E1p16 is central to the Ethics. Numerous later propositions rely on it.
It is not a proposition which one can dispense with and leave the rest of
the book intact. The fact that in this text Spinoza explicitly considers
modes as properties of God should count as very strong evidence that
modes not only inhere in God, but are also properties of God. There are
other texts which further support this conclusion. First, let us recall texts
we discussed when we tried to show that modes inhere in God. Some of
these texts clearly support the further claim that modes are properties of
God. The passage from Spinoza’s Compendium of the Hebrew Grammar,
in which Spinoza claims that participles relate to adjectives just as modes
relate to attributes clearly implies that modes are (non-essential) proper-
ties.161 Similarly, Leibniz’s report on his conversations with Spinoza, in
which he ascribes to Spinoza the ‘‘paradoxical’’ view that apart from
God all things are ‘‘only modes or accidents’’ of God, implies that Leib-
niz takes Spinoza’s modes to be properties predicated of God (since, for
Leibniz, accidents are properties predicated of their subject162). Finally,
we have seen that the same relation which holds between God and his
aﬀections (i.e., modes) must also hold between the body and the aﬀec-
tions of the body [corporis aﬀectiones], i.e., between modes of modes and
the modes they modify.163 Now, in E3p55c2d Spinoza considers aﬀects164
160 Spinoza uses ‘properties’ in the technical sense of propria in at least three other
places in the Ethics (E1app [II ⁄ 77 ⁄ 22], E3defAﬀ6e [II ⁄ 192 ⁄ 24], and E3defAﬀ22e),
as well as in the fourth chapter of the TTP [III ⁄ 60 ⁄ 9] and in Letter 60. It is also
likely that E2d3 uses ‘proprietates’ in the technical sense. Among modern transla-
tions of the Ethics, Jakob Klatzkin’s extraordinary Hebrew translation (1923)
stands out in its explicit and systematic detection of the technical use of ‘proprie-
tates.’ Klatzkin translates ‘proprietates’ in E1p16d (and in the other texts men-
tioned above) with ‘Segulot,’ which is the technical medieval Hebrew term for
propria (I am indebted to Zeev Harvey for pointing this out to me). For reference
to medieval Hebrew uses of this notion, see Klatzkin’s Thesaurus philosophicus
linguae Hebraicae et veteris recentioris (1928), 91-2. See also Curley’s helpful dis-
cussion of proprium in the glossary to his translation (Spinoza, Collected Works I,
652), and Garrett, ‘‘Spinoza’s conatus Argument, p. 156-7, n. 24). My account of
E1p16d is very close to Garrett’s reading of this crucial text (in his ‘‘Spinoza’s
Necessitarianism’’ and ‘‘Spinoza’s conatus Argument’’).
161 See §3 argument (xi) above.
162 See 3.9 above (cf. argument (x)). In De Summa Rerum 574, Leibniz deﬁnes an
‘‘accident of a thing’’ [Accidens rei] as a contingent predicate
[praedicatum contingens]. Similarly, in the Addenda to the Specimen of the Universal
Calculus, Leibniz deﬁnes ‘accident’ as ‘‘the adjectival predicate of a substantival
subject in a particular aﬃrmation proposition only’’ (Leibniz, Logical Papers, 46).
163 See §3 argument (viii) above.
164 An aﬀect [aﬀectus] is an aﬀection (i.e., a mode) [aﬀectio] of the body or of the
mind that increases or diminishes its power of acting (E3d3).
YITZHAK Y. MELAMED 69
such as the powers of the body or mind to be predicated [praedicare] of
human beings.165 But if aﬀections such as these powers are predicated of the
body, the same should hold in the relation of the aﬀections of God to God.166
165 ‘‘So no man desires that there be predicated of him [praedicari cupiet] any power
of acting, or (what is the same) virtue, which is peculiar to another’s nature and
alien to his own’’ (E3p55c2d). The issue at stake here is jealousy; hence the desire
to have certain powers predicated of oneself is not a desire to be known as having
these powers, but rather the desire to actually have the powers. The predication is
a predication of the powers themselves rather than the reputation of having the
powers (i.e., being known or being described as having the powers).
166 The last piece of evidence I wish to consider here is E3p5, a crucial proposition in the
development of the doctrine of the conatus. I will not discuss this text in detail because it
will force us to consider Spinoza’s view of logic, an issue as fascinating as it is diﬃcult.
P5: Things are of a contrary nature, i.e., cannot be in the same subject, insofar as
one can destroy the other [Res eatenus contrariae sunt naturae, hoc est, eatenus in
eodem subiecto esse nequeunt, quatenus una alteram potest destruere].
Dem.: For if they could agree with one another, or be in the same subject at once,
then there could be something in the same subject which could destroy it, which (by
P4) is absurd. Therefore, things etc., q.e.d.
Two questions suggest themselves regarding this text. First, what does Spinoza
mean by the relation of ‘being in the same subject’? Obviously, he cannot mean that
two conﬂicting parts cannot be in the same whole, since he openly discusses various
conﬂicts between opposite forces that are parts of the same whole (such as opposing
parties in the state). Second, why does Spinoza use the logical term ‘subjectum’ to
describe one thing being in another? One may argue that ‘things’ are prima facie of the
wrong logical type to be capable of being in a logical subject (what is in a subject
should be properties).
If I understand Spinoza correctly, this proposition does in fact deal with a logical
subject, and what he is asserting here is that a subject cannot have opposite properties
or modes because (that’s how I understand the role of ‘quatenus’ here) this would
cause an internal destruction of the subject. Modes are ‘in a subject.’ When two
opposite things are both internal to a certain third thing, they cannot be modes of
that thing, but only parts of it (as in the relation of two parties to their state). Were
the subject to have two opposite modes, a logical contradiction would follow since a
subject would have opposite properties (note Spinoza’s use of the clause ‘‘at the same
time’’ [simul], which seems to be modeled after the common formulation of the law of
non-contradiction). What is most fascinating in E3p5d is that the mere fact that cer-
tain state of aﬀairs (in our case, a subject having opposite modes) constitutes a con-
tradiction does not seem to suﬃce to show that this state of aﬀairs cannot obtain. It
is only the resulting internal destruction of the subject (the impossibility of which Spi-
noza proved in E3p4) that excludes the possibility of a contradictory state of aﬀairs.
Hence, I suspect that for Spinoza the law of non-contradiction is a consequence of
the more fundamental principle of the conatus (E3p4). This daring view needs to be
carefully examined and clariﬁed, a task that should not be carried out here.
Yet even our preliminary discussion of E3p5 seems to show quite clearly that for Spi-
noza things (just like properties) can be in a subject, and that having two opposite
things in the same subject (just as having two opposite properties in the same subject)
yields a contradiction. In other words, Spinoza does not seem to reject the possibility
that things, at least in certain contexts, function as properties of other things. For an
illuminating and comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of the conatus, see Gar-
rett’s article ‘‘Spinoza’s conatus Argument.’’ I believe that the few suggestions I
sketch in this footnote are mostly in agreement with his interpretation. In particular,
I believe Garrett is right in reading the ‘in se’ clause in E3p6 in its technical sense.
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One last note on this issue. Spinoza is commonly considered to have
assimilated causality to conceptual derivation.167 Once we realize that
for Spinoza particular things are properties, much of the mystery about
this assimilation disappears, since it is much easier to explain causal
relations between qualities (such as essence and propria) as conceptual
derivations than to consider causal relations between things as concep-
tual derivations.168
Once we have arrived at the conclusion that for Spinoza modes are
properties, we can address the question of whether Spinoza committed
a category mistake in maintaining this position. As one may expect
from the line of argumentation I have been developing, I do not think
that Spinoza committed such a mistake. His view of particular things
as God’s propria is bold, innovative and counter-commonsense (all of
which might well be characteristics of good philosophy, depending on
what one seeks when philosophizing), but as far as I can see, no cate-
gory mistake has been committed. In order for particular things to be
of the wrong logical kind and thus unable to serve as properties, there
should be at least two well-distinguished and mutually irreducible cate-
gories of properties and things.169 Although such a distinction is present
in our colloquial talk, it was thoroughly undermined by the philoso-
phers of the early modern period, and is further challenged in contem-
porary discussions of the metaphysics of properties.
We can begin with Descartes’ claim that entities have different
degrees of reality or thinghood, and that ‘‘real qualities or incomplete
substances’’ (if there are any) are more real than modes and less real
than complete substances.
I have also made it quite clear how reality admits of more and less. A
substance is more of a thing than a mode; if there are real qualities or
incomplete substances, they are things to a greater extent than modes,
but to a lesser extent than complete substances; and, ﬁnally, if there is
an inﬁnite and independent substance, it is more of a thing than a
ﬁnite and dependent substance. All this is completely self-evident.
(Third Set of Replies (AT VII 185| CSM II 130))
Descartes does not say this explicitly, but the logic of his text seems to
commit him to the claim that the more complete a substance becomes,
the more real it is and the more it is a thing [res]. Hence, the diﬀerence
167 See, for example, Curley, ‘‘On Bennett’s Interpretation,’’ 48.
168 Indeed, the ﬁrst conclusion that Spinoza draws from his claim in E1p16d that all
particular things follow from God’s essence as his propria is that God is the eﬃ-
cient cause of all things (E1p6c1).
169 If things like Mt. Rushmore are reducible to certain properties, then there should
not be any problem in saying that Mt. Rushmore is a property.
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between qualities and things seems to be one of degree and not an
unbridgeable dichotomy. Similarly, Arnauld and Nicole’s talk about
‘‘substantial modes’’170 clearly rejects any clear-cut distinction between
substance and mode (a distinction which should have barred one kind
of thing from functioning as the other). The most famous early modern
attack on the distinction between things and qualities was Hume’s cri-
tique of the notion of substance. According to Hume, substances are
nothing but bundles of qualities, and any theory that assumes a bare
particular underlying these qualities is just playing with unwarranted
ﬁction.171 Finally, certain texts of Descartes172 and of Leibniz173 seem to
suggest that at least in some period of their philosophical development,
each of the two considered substances to be identical with the totality
of their essential properties.
In the twentieth century the view of things as bundles of qualities
was argued by several notable scholars. In his Inquiry into Meaning
and Truth, Russell argued that ‘‘what is commonly called a ‘thing’ is
nothing but a bundle of coexisting qualities such as redness, hardness,
etc.’’174 Among contemporary trope theories,175 the bolder (and
170 See §5 above.
171 ‘‘We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of par-
ticular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason
concerning it’’ (A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part I, Section VI). Cf. Book
I, Part IV, Section VI.
172 See Descartes’ Conversation with Burman, §22: ‘‘It is true that the attributes are
the same as the substance, but this is when they are taken together, not when they
are taken individually, one by one.’’ In the very same conversation, however, Des-
cartes seems to make the opposite claim, i.e., that ‘‘in addition to the attribute
which speciﬁes the substance, one must think of the substance itself which is the
substrate of that attribute’’ (§25). In his editorial comments, John Cottingham
makes, I think, a good case for the view that ‘‘Descartes did not subscribe to the
real existence, behind observable qualities, of a ‘naked and hidden substance’’’
and that, for Descartes, ‘‘when you have created all the attributes of a thing you
have eo ipso created the substance’’ (pp. 78-9).
173 According to some interpretations, Leibniz’s doctrine of the ‘‘predicate in con-
cept’’ (see §8 of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686)) makes substances to be just
‘‘the totality of their predicates’’ (see Ian Hacking, ‘‘Individual Substance,’’ 1972,
p. 138. Cf. Bigelow’s view of Leibnizian Monads as ‘‘unshareable conjunctions of
severally-shareable properties’’ (‘‘Particulars,’’ § 3)), though, obviously, not every
aggregation of predicates constitutes a substance. This line of thought was
adopted by Leibniz’s eighteenth century successors, Wolﬀ and Baumgarten.
174 Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, 1940, p. 97.
175 Tropes are (roughly speaking) non-universal properties, or properties which are
particular to their subjects (e.g., ‘the whiteness of this wall,’ or ‘the height of the
Empire State Building’). The term ‘trope’ was coined by D.C. Williams (see his
‘‘On the Element of Being: I,’’ 1997, p. 115). Other terms used to designate these
entities are ‘moments,’ ‘abstract particulars,’ ‘particular properties,’ and ‘particular
qualities.’
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arguably, more interesting176) cluster of theories takes both universals
and individuals to be constructs of tropes.177 Universals are bundles of
tropes which exactly resemble each other; individuals are bundles of
compresent (or concurrent) tropes.178 Hence, to predicate a property u
of an individual a is nothing but saying that u is part of the compres-
ent cluster of tropes a.179
If individuals are bundles of qualities (either particular or universal
properties), the allegedly clear-cut distinction between things (individu-
als) and properties is thoroughly undermined.180 Clearly, Spinoza would
reject many of the views we have just surveyed.181 In particular, Spinoza
would strongly reject the suggestion that the indivisible substance (qua
176 The main motivation for trope theories (at least in contemporary discussions) is
ontological parsimony. Hence, theories which reduce both individuals and univer-
sals to tropes (perhaps together with the two universal operators of compresence
and precise resemblance) have the signiﬁcant advantage of being the most parsi-
monious (assuming that this reduction turns out to be successful). For a similar
argument against theories which assume both universals and tropes as primitive,
see Armstrong, ‘‘Properties,’’ 1997, p. 168.
177 See D.C. Williams, ‘‘The Elements of Being: I.’’ Cf. Bacon, ‘‘Tropes,’’ 2002. Keith
Campbell (‘‘The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars,’’ 1997) endorses Williams’
claim that individuals are bundles of tropes, though he is less optimistic about
trope theory’s ability to account for the problem of universals (133-5).
178 In many trope theories the relations of ‘exact resemblance’ and ‘compresence’ are
deﬁned in a second-order language (though Williams (‘‘On the Elements of Being:
I,’’ 120) rejects this suggestion).
179 Williams, ‘‘The Elements of Being: I,’’ 113, 117-9.
180 Mellor and Oliver (1997) suggest that trope theories ‘‘accept that particulars and
universals diﬀer in kind’’ (17). This does not seem to be the case, at least not with
regard to trope theories which take tropes to be parts of the individual they consti-
tute. Indeed, D.C. Williams is quite explicit on this issue: ‘‘What a diﬀerence of
logical ‘type’ amounts to, particularly in the philosophy of tropes, is far from
clear, but everybody agrees that a sum is of the same type with its terms, as whole
is of the same type with its parts, a man of the same type with his arms and legs’’
(‘‘Elements of Being: I,’’ 117). A few lines down, Williams argues that tropes relate
to individuals as parts to a whole (117-8), though he leaves open the question
whether the relation of tropes to universals is a part-whole relation or that of a
member to its set. The general tone of Williams is quite critical of theories of logi-
cal types. See particularly his criticism of the view which holds that ‘‘if y can be
‘predicated’ of x, or ‘inheres in’ or ‘characterizes’ x, or if x is ‘an instance’ of y,
then x and y must be sundered by a unique logical and ontological abyss’’ (119).
In Campbell’s theory the issue is somewhat less clear. Campbell sometimes seems
to take the distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ entities to be clear-cut,
though he still maintains that concrete particulars (individuals) are just sums of
abstract particulars, or tropes (see p. 128).
181 It is also the case that for Spinoza ordinary objects (e.g., chairs, gorillas, kings of
France) are each a property of God (and not each a bundle of properties), but this
dissimilarity with contemporary bundle theorists does not undermine my main
point that there is no category mistake involved in conceiving things as properties.
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thing) is a bundle of properties.182 But this is beside the point. I do not
discuss these theories in order to show their ‘‘support’’ of Spinoza’s
views, but rather to argue that a view which takes things—like Mt. Rush-
more—as properties is far from being nonsense or a category mistake. If
Curley wishes to substantiate his claims, he would ﬁrst have to provide a
detailed defense of the view that things and properties belong to two irre-
ducible categories, or types, and, secondly, show that Spinoza accepts a
clear-cut distinction between things and properties. As far as I can see,
there are clear indications that Spinoza rejects this distinction.
One important element that Spinoza did have in common with the the-
ories we have just surveyed is the rejection of bare particulars. If particu-
lar things are not reducible to their qualities, then (insofar as the non-
reducible residue is quality-free) we seem to be committed to the existence
of the notorious ‘‘bare substratum.’’ An entity of that sort, whose essence
and existence cannot be explained (insofar as it has no qualities) is intol-
erable for an unyielding rationalist like Spinoza.183 Indeed, when Spinoza
encounters Aristotelian prime matter—the oldest member of the bare
particulars clan—he oﬀers nothing but ridicule. For him, the statement
‘‘extended thing without extension,’’ just like ‘‘thinking thing without
any thought’’ (i.e., will) is simply an oxymoron.184
Before we conclude our discussion, let me brieﬂy address the views of
two other scholars who attempted to defend the traditional view of
modes. Charles Jarrett and John Carriero have suggested (independently)
that Spinozistic modes are particular qualities (or tropes) that inhere in
the substance.185 I agree that Spinozistic modes are properties of the
182 Campbell points out the ‘‘long-standing and deeply ingrained prejudice’’ according
to which individual things are ‘‘the minimal beings capable of independent exis-
tence’’ (127). Obviously, Spinoza shares this ‘‘prejudice’’ against the self-subsis-
tence of tropes, since modes depend on the substance. Another possible conﬂict
between Spinoza’s view and trope theory is the issue of the possibility of perfectly
similar tropes, which Spinoza, following his endorsement of the Identity of Indis-
cernibles (E1p4), would be pressed to reject.
183 For this point I am indebted to several discussions with Michael Della Rocca and
particularly to his explication of Spinozistic rationalism.
184 See CM II, xii| I ⁄ 280 ⁄ 18-32. For a similar twentieth century criticism of bare par-
ticulars see Sellars’ claim (Science, Perception, and Reality, 1963, pp. 282-3) that
proponents of bare particulars endorse the contradictory view that things which
posses attributes have in fact no attributes.
185 See Jarrett, ‘‘Substance and Mode,’’ 86, and Carriero, ‘‘Mode and Substance in Spi-
noza,’’ 256-9. As mentioned above, Jarrett and Carriero have also argued (again,
independently of one another) that Curley wrongly assimilates inherence with predi-
cation, and that, if I understand them correctly, modes inhere in the substance but
are not predicated of the substance. They presumably distinguish ‘being predicated
of x’ and ‘being a property of x’ (perhaps they consider only universals to be predi-
cated of things). It appears to me, however, that given Spinoza’s explicit use of predi-
caere in E3p55c2d, we cannot ascribe to Spinoza such a distinction.
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substance, and it is also clear that Spinoza does not believe in the reality
of universals. For Spinoza, universals are mere mental abstractions that
compensate for the limited capacities of our imagination by allowing it to
represent a large number of things through one vague representation
(E2p40s1).186 If modes are properties rather than universals, it may seem
obvious that they are particular properties. Yet the issue is somewhat
more complicated. I earlier noted that Spinoza cannot accept most mod-
ern trope theories, since he clearly denies that substance is a bundle of
modes or tropes. But even if we consider the understanding of particular
accidents as it was articulated by the Scholastics (and suggested by Jar-
rett and Carriero as an explanation of Spinozistic modes),187 there are still
issues that need to be addressed. Since for Spinoza there is only one ulti-
mate subject of predication (i.e., God), one may wonder whether the dis-
tinction between particular and universal properties has any place in
such a theory. The distinction between universals and particular proper-
ties is commonly viewed as a distinction between repeatable and unre-
peatable properties. Obviously, a Spinozistic mode does not repeat
itself in two substances because there is only one substance,188 but per-
haps it would have been repeatable had there been more than one sub-
stance.189
One way to approach this problem is to consider whether, for Spi-
noza, modes of modes are repeatable, i.e., whether two modes of God
can share the same mode of a mode. Although I tend to believe that
for Spinoza two bodies cannot have the very same affection, I am not
Bennett originally rejected the very concept of particular qualities, as well as the
attribution of this doctrine to Spinoza, as ‘‘non-sense’’ (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics,
94). Recently, he has apparently changed his views and escorted both trope theory
and its attribution to Spinoza (Learning from Six Philosophers, I 145).
186 Cf. Ep. 2 (IV ⁄ 9 ⁄ 12-15), Ep. 19 (IV ⁄ 91-92), CM I, i (I ⁄ 235 ⁄ 14-15), CM II, vii
(I ⁄ 263 ⁄ 8), TdIE 99 (I ⁄ 36 ⁄ 18).
187 Whether Aristotelian non-substantial particulars are tropes is a subject of major
scholarly dispute. For three diﬀerent opinions, see Ackrill (Categories and De In-
terpretatione), Owen (‘‘Inherence’’), and Frede (Essays).
188 Similarly, one cannot say that the same mode of God repeats itself in two tempo-
ral locations, since in such a case the two alleged mode-instances will be distin-
guished only by their temporal indexicals, while Spinoza denies that time,
duration, as well as number belong to the essence of anything (E1p8s2 and
E3p4d), and holds that things can be distinguished from each other only by their
essences (E1p5).
189 In such a case, a mode would seem to be a universal, yet Spinoza’s critique of
universals would not apply to it insofar as it is not an abstraction that aids our
limited memory.
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aware of any explicit text that rules out this possibility.190 Another way
to resolve the issue is by looking more carefully at the alleged possibil-
ity of two substances A and B sharing a mode m. Let’s assume that
there’s a change in mode m. The cause of the change can come from
either of the two substances. However, if A is the cause of the change
in m, it would seem that substance A caused a change in substance B
(since m is also a mode of B), whereas Spinoza strictly rejects any cau-
sal interaction between substances (E1p6d). We therefore conclude that
a mode cannot be shared by two substances, and is thus an irrepeatable
property.
Yet before we endorse the conclusion that modes are tropes, we
should clarify our understanding of the concept of ‘trope’ in relation to
the things vs. properties distinction. If tropes are taken to be on the
side of properties in a clear-cut distinction between things and
properties, it would seem that we cannot aptly describe Spinozistic
modes as tropes. All the evidence that we have shows that Spinoza
takes modes to be both things and properties, i.e., that he is consciously
undermining the distinction between things and properties. But, if one
takes tropes to be entities which bridge, or even undermine, the distinc-
tion between things and properties (just as in D.C. Williams’s view of
tropes191), then modes can be identiﬁed with tropes.
We can conclude that modes may be identiﬁed with tropes, depend-
ing on our understanding of the nature of tropes.
Another interesting approach that tried to defend the view of modes
as predicated of substance is Bennett’s ﬁeld-metaphysic. Bennett
attempts to explain how bodies can be reasonably considered as predi-
cated of the substance by suggesting that extended modes are continu-
ous strings of place-times. Just as the motion of a storm is nothing but
190 E3p57s seems to be a crucial passage in this context, but it is quite ambivalent.
On the one hand Spinoza talks about aﬀections belonging to certain kinds of
things, such as ‘human lust’ and ‘equine lust’ (presumably allowing the same lust
to repeat itself within the domain of the same genus), but on the other hand he
claims that ‘‘the gladness of one [individual] diﬀers from the gladness of the other
as much the essence of the one diﬀers from the essence of the other,’’ a claim
which seems to make each aﬀection particularized to its individual. I tend to see
Spinoza’s talk about ‘equine lust’ as merely loose (or perhaps he takes ‘equine lust’
as a mere abstraction from the variety of lusts we have encountered in horses),
but I would be somewhat hesitant to rely merely on this text in order to resolve
the issue of whether modes of modes are repeatable. If I am not mistaken, part of
the problem lies in the fact that Spinoza does not clearly distinguish between
modes of the body which are the body’s propria (which should be unrepeatable),
and modes of the body of which the body is only a partial cause. In the latter
case, one can read the ﬁrst axiom of the short physical discussion in Part 2 (II ⁄ 99)
as allowing modes of modes (which are not propria) to be in more than one
subject.
191 See footnote 180 above.
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a (continuous) temporally spread string of continuous regions of space
having a certain property, so Napoleon and Mt. Rushmore are nothing
but temporally-spread strings of regions of space having certain proper-
ties.192 Now, I think that something like this should be true of the way
Spinoza considers extended modes to be properties of the substance.193
I also agree with Bennett’s recent claim that his ﬁeld-metaphysic inter-
pretation is consistent with the view that modes are particular proper-
ties.194 However, Bennett’s ﬁeld-metaphysic provides an explanation as
to how modes can be considered properties of substance only with
regard to one out of inﬁnitely many attributes, i.e., Extension. A far
more general explanation of the issue is needed, and I hope that in the
work we have done so far, we have made signiﬁcant progress toward
providing it.195
7. Conclusions
Our close examination of a signiﬁcant body of texts shows that Spinoza
considered particular things, such as Mt. Rushmore and Napoleon, to be
modes inhering in God, and that Spinoza was a pantheist. I have sug-
gested that Bayle’s three objections to Spinoza’s view of particular things
as modes of God rely on certain misunderstandings of Spinoza, such as
the attribution of traditional views regarding evil and divine immutability
to him that he in fact rejected. I have also argued that Spinoza considered
modes—such as Mt. Rushmore—not only to inhere in God but also to
be a property of God. Speciﬁcally, I suggested that for Spinoza, Mt.
192 See Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 89-90 and Learning from Six Philoso-
phers, I 142-4.
193 I do not agree with Bennett’s identiﬁcation of the extended substance with space.
Space, insofar as it has regions, is divisible. The account of the indivisibility of
space Bennett develops (Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 85-8) seems to me much weaker
than Spinoza’s actual view as to the indivisibility of substance. As far as I can see,
Extension has neither actual nor potential parts, whereas regions of space seem to
be potential parts of space. If I understand Spinoza correctly, space is just an inﬁ-
nite mode (either immediate or not) of Extension. Hence, though I agree with the
basic idea of explaining extended modes through the ﬁeld-metaphysic, I think it
should be applied merely to the inﬁnite mode of Extension, while keeping the
attribute of extension completely indivisible. In this account, regions of space
(such as bodies) are just parts of a property, i.e., parts of an inﬁnite mode
of Extension. For a similar criticism of Bennett, see Schmaltz, ‘‘Spinoza on
Vacuum.’’
194 See Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers, I 145.
195 Another point on which I somewhat disagree with Bennett is his view of ‘‘Spino-
zistic ‘modes’ as belonging to the property side of the line between things and
properties’’ (A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 92). As previously mentioned, I do not
see any reason to believe that Spinoza marked any clear line between things and
properties, and he certainly never hesitated to call modes ‘things [res].’
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Rushmore and all other ﬁnite modes are God’s propria. Finally, I have
claimed that Spinoza’s view of Mt. Rushmore as inhering in, and being a
property of, God does not commit any category mistake. It is certainly a
bold and interesting view, but it is far from being nonsense. Even if Spi-
noza’s metaphysics is wild, it is, I believe, far more interesting and
instructive to observe the beast rather than domesticate it.
The historical and philosophical import of Curley’s bold interpreta-
tion of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza can hardly be overesti-
mated. It was not only crucial insofar as it made Spinoza a respectable
philosopher within the community of analytic philosophy and set strict
scholarly demands for clarity and precision, but most importantly it
was powerful enough to make people think through—rather than
recite—Spinoza. As one can see from my arguments, I have signiﬁcant
disagreements with his interpretation. Yet, as basic fairness demands
acknowledgement of one’s debts, it would not be inappropriate
to say—using a phrase originally said of the great Russian writer
Gogol—that ‘‘we all came out of his overcoat.’’
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